Raamin Mostaghimi
4/11/07
AFP Section Writing

Ambrose and Brinkley's "Bush and the Gulf War"

What I found interesting about this reading was the comparison of Bush I's pre-war actions to those of Truman and Johnson. Bush's command of the situation seemed much more impressive than Truman's or Johnson's, if only because he learned from their mistakes. He didn't make the mistakes of incremental escalation or micromanagement of the war effort like Johnson in Vietnam, nor did he make the mistake of not garnering any international support like Truman in Korea. Instead, he managed to get a UN-based coalition force to help fight and pay for the war, he went to Congress for authorization beforehand, and he let the generals do the fighting based on the Powell doctrine, which essentially annihilated the Iraqi army.
Although comparing the success of this war to the modern-day Iraq war may be interesting, I think it's more interesting to discuss the aftermath of the 1st Gulf War. As Ambrose and Brinkley say, the American people overwhelmingly supported President Bush during and immediately after the conflict, but after the honeymoon period was over his approval dropped so precipitously that he actually failed to be reelected. The idea of the USA as the world's policeman is an appealing one, but the implications are not necessarily so nice-sounding. One of the criticisms leveled against Bush after the 1st Gulf War was that the US didn't stay and finish the job, which emphasized a new style of American warmaking- quick entrance with massive and overwhelming force, then exit as soon as stated limited objectives are complete. Critics lambasted the American war machine for this policy and for not staying to rebuild the affected states (both in Iraq and in Panama, 1989), but I don't have too much of a problem with the policy myself. What I do have a problem with is selected enforcement of US police powers on moral grounds. If the true reason that the US didn't intervene in Yugoslavia but did intervene in Iraq was because of US oil interests in the region, then this is a legitimate display of power politics, and I don't have a problem with that. But if the US decides to elevate itself to the moral high ground in the conflict to 'punish aggression,' then it should do so consistently and to the best of its ability, and this is an extremely dangerous route for it to take. Better to stick with power politics, in my opinion.

AFP NOTES 4/10

dammit, no outline written up there today, this will be a problem
Lecture 21: Neoconservatism & the Bush Doctrine

Bush comes to office, warring factions within his administration
-neocons are prominent
-multilateralism starts to die out
-there is NO balancing power against the US, it's just a hegemony
-this is puzzling
A) George W. Bush (2001- )

Bretton Woods, GATT, NATO, UN
these are part of the reason that there's no real challenge to the US
-multilateral economic and security agreements
-originally was to bring other countries on board with American framework and interests
-other countries get in on them for the alliance-based security system in Europe

Multilateralism
america joins these, flying in the face of Washington's farewell address
-does them in order to ensure certain things
-wants to make sure that up and coming industrial powers are american-style
-also works to establish moral norms for the regimes
they still exist now, even when they're irrelevant
-NATO is the prime example of this
-there's no reason for it to exist- ussr is gone- but it's still there
-still attractive for states to join, because of the security benefits
-no real reason for it to break apart
now, the number of multilateral agreements has increased by 2/3 in recent times
-US is becoming more and more a part of these agreements
-roughly 150 multilateral treaties involving US in 1950
-400 in 1980
-by 2000, approx. 600
International Court of Justice
even though the US is part of these agreements, it doesn't really have to abide by them
-Nicaraguans take the US to court over the contra scandal
-nicaraguans win
-US just rescinds court's jurisdiction over the US
-same sort of thing happens, when US is fined in a non-binding resolution by the UN
-US just ignores it unilaterally
New Sovereigntists
Unilateral dissolution of multilateral agreements are AOK

On the left, economic autonomy is seen to be threatened
-NAFTA, CAFTA, etc are said to be destroying US economic autonomy

On the right, political autonomy is seen to be threatened
-arms control, use of force, etc agreements are said to be threatening political autonomy
'because the US is fully sovereign, it can determine for itself what to follow'
-the constitution says that sovereignty is paramount
-the ONLY obligations that the US has are internal, NO EXTERNAL OBLIGATIONS

3 criticisms by the New Sovereigntists
-International regimes and legal structures are broad and without legitimacy
-they're so broad and such because they're trying to incorporate as many states as possible, lose legitimacy that wya
-international regimes are unaccountable
-US political system is accountable to the voters
-international regimes have no such accountability
-constitutional duty
-US autonomy is primary
-ONLY US OBLIGATION IS TO THE CONSTITUTION
-there is no reason at all for the US to follow international law, etc, besides good will
-US can opt out of any of them at any time

examples of US failures to commit (or stay committed to) multilateral agreements during Clinton administration
-Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty
-land mines convention
-international criminal court
-kyoto protocol
-convention on the rights of the child
during Bush admin
-biological weapons convention
-small and light arms convention
-withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty, June 2002

'when it comes to our security, we really don't need anybody's permission'
-bush doctine

charles krauthammer called it the 'new unilateralism'
-new unilateralism seeks to strengthen american power and deploy it to international ends
-clears away 'web of constraining international agreements'

formation of three factions within the republican party
-paleo-conservatives
-heirs of the old republican isolationists/exemplarists
-now that the cold war's over, American duty to the world is done, we should go back to isolationism
-neo-conservatives
-internationalists/vindicationists
-america's duty is NOT finished
-world is still full of threats, still monsters to destroy
-neocons split into two groups
-vulcans
-took the name from the roman gold vulcan, god of the forge
-aaaaand he made a star trek reference. critiquing the name of the vulcan race. holy god.
-firmly entrenched in the Dept of Defense, VP's office, and in the private sector at the time of Bush's administration
-NSA Condi Rice, DefenseSec Rumsfeld, Dept DefSec Wolfowitz, VP Cheney
-questioned validity of deterrence and containment
-promoted aggressive actions on international scale
-attacked multilateral agreements
-most active proponents of expanding the war on terror to encompass states, terrorism is an issue of foreign policy/int'l relations
-evangelical interpretation of internationalism- power = a moralizing force
-only if it's consistent with american interests
-'project for a new american century' (PNAC)
-vehicle for advancing the NeoReaganite policies
-cochaired by Bill Kristol and Donald Keagan
-guardians
-contrast to vulcans
-'reluctant warriors'
-occupied StateDept, and served with bill clinton as well
-SecState Powell, DepSecState Armitage, Director of StateDept Planning Staff Haas
-huge divergence of opinion between StateDept and DoD, also dichotomy between NSA and CIA
-guardians are highly resistant to engagements where use of force is the first option
-diplomatic, economic maneuvering to contain states
-even police actions are better options
-pays attention to balancing US power with other states
-NOT LOOKING FOR HEGEMONY
-even just preeminence among like-minded states
-two groups of neocons have been fighting for control since Bush I
-wolfowitz with cheney and libby wrote a memo detailing how to deal with the fall of the soviet union
-US should INCREASE defense spending
-assert itself as the sole superpower to quash the rise of regional powers that take advantage of the fall of the soviet union
-first use of the term 'coalitions of the willing'
-US cannot bring on board all multilateral structures, but bring whoever we can convince
-even if we can't, we'll bring on board whoever we can
-and we'll take action ourselves in 'defense of our interests
-first time preventive and preemptive war were brought into discussion
-bush I told them to sanitize the paper, remove all preemptive or unilateral action
-guardians win this round
-vulcans then start arguing that containment has failed
-new strategy is necessary to remove saddam hussein from power
-when bush II takes office, CHINA is the vulcan's plan of action
-advocates action NOW rather than later, while the balance of power was still on their side
-Sept. 11, 2001 happened
-turns out that all along, international terrorist organizations are now the biggest problem
-on SEPT 12, rumsfeld asked about attacking iraq as well as al-qaeda
-vulcans still looking to move up
-powell avoided striking iraq
-said that US should attack Al-Qaeda first
-right then, american people were looking to get back at Osama and Al-Qaeda
-over powell's objection, Bush called the attacks more than acts of terror, but ACTS OF WAR
-vulcans win here, it's the start of a WAR between states and non-states
-terrorism is the new threat to meet American power
-bush quote- we will pursue terrorists wherever they hide and hut anyone that helps them
-'you are with us or against us'
-THATS THE BUSH DOCTRINE RIGHT THERE ^^
-now vulcans support 'regime change' in iraq
-state of the union in 2002, bush puts iraq in the 'axis of evil'
-presented as a prime threat to the US
-June 2002- bush says that the marine corps must be ready to strike at a moment's notice anywhere in the world
-states that the US must be ready to take preemptive military action to ensure security
-same thing said in the state of the union- identifying threats and eliminating them BEFORE THEY HAPPEN
-National security statement, 2002
-US CANNOT USE DEFENSIVE POSTURE
-terrorists now use weapons of mass destruction, so any act they take will be devastating
-US must take anticipatory action to defend itself, EVEN IF UNCERTAINTY REMAINS in the time and place
-preemptive action's benefits beat out any possible costs that may be incurred
-containment and deterrence have gone out the window
-deterrence based solely on retaliation doesnt even work against rogue states, because they dont really care what happens to them
-no way in HELL it's gonna work against non-state actors
-now america is going out and looking for 'monsters to destroy'
-the view is that america asked for what happened on sept 11, because it wasn't proactive enough
-'liberal, humanitarianist imperialism' has worked in the balkans, it'll work in the middle east as well
-US needs to respond with asymmetric response to terrorist action
-massive retaliation is the way to go
-appeasement is what's been happening essentially with terrorists so far
-we had the chance to eliminate saddam in gulf war 1
-abandoning iraq in gulf war I was 'as shameful as abandoning south vietnam in 1975'
-taking out saddam hussein is justified as an expression of american national defense and self interest
-we need to impose 'effective imperial oversight' in the middle east
-'if we have to go it alone, we'll go it alone, but i'd rather not'
-in the end, war in iraq happened essentially alone, without UNSC resolution
-tenacious multilateralism still applies to the US and US actions, but not as much as it used to
-both US and Israel have signaled that they'd be willing to take unilateral, preemptive action against agressors

AFP NOTES 4/9

FINAL EXAM
SATURDAY, MAY 5
10:00-11:30 am
HODSON 110

Lecture 20: Unipolar Foreign Policy

A) The End of History?
collapse of USSR was so unexpected, people were calling it the 'end of history'
-francis fukuyama wrote the book
-'events would continue to happen, but debates, arguments, etc, had ceased to evolve'
-there is no alternative, evolutionary go-to point after US-style capitalism

america has emerged through bipolarity and multipolarity as the SOLE pole- unipolarity
-unipolarity isn't really as unprecedented as you'd think
-america had been the unipolar figure within the western hemisphere for some time
-there was NO BALANCING against the united states in the western hemisphere for some time

Pax Americana
America gets to police the 'pax americana'
-america has essentially a massive opportunity for 'muscle flexing' on the international stage

Hegemony
america was the hegemon OF THE WORLD
-NOBODY could fight against him
Vietnam Syndrome
no more little shitty wars in the third world
-american people just wouldn't have it
-people thought that america had escaped from vietnam syndrome after 1st gulf war, but it hadnt

instead, the people of the US just became SQUEAMISH
-massive dissatisfaction with government actions, expectations of success shoot through the roof
-Americans wish that wars could be won without the loss of a single US life
-now, instead of external balancing forces from other countries, there is internal dissatisfaction acting as an INTERNAL balancer

B) Cold War Legacies

Now, america can actually act on its moral grounds
-no longer does the US have to tolerate local warlords because they occupy key strategic choke points
-most importantly manuel noriega, saddam hussein
another priority is cutting off support to US proxy states
-no longer has to keep its proxy states in the game to fight the soviet union
-soviet union collapsed, their proxies collapse as well
-most obviously- Yugoslavia
-yugoslavia tore itself apart
-US client states included
-afghanistan, liberia, somalia
-now they're basically cut off
-these states degenerate into basically anarchy
-eventually the US moves to fix some of the problems in somalia and yugoslavia
-however, ignores afghanistan and liberia
-we see now, ignoring afghanistan was a problem- we're feeling BLOWBACK

final priority- dealing with humanitarian crises around the world
-now that the USSR was gone, their veto with it, the US thought that they could actually deal with humanitarian crises around the world
-however, this seems to fail
-two major crises- haiti, rwanda
-in NEITHER of them did the UN do anything of consequence
-whyyy???

US is essentially devoid of any sort of coherent foreign policy around the world
-this is a REAL PROBLEM
-international system becomes more anarchic now, rather than more stable

George H.W. Bush (1989-93)
first post-cold war president
-first issue- PANAMA, manuel noriega
Manuel Noriega
dictator of panama
-graduate of 'school of the americas'
-essentially a CIA training camp
-was on teh CIA payroll
-was a participant in the war with the contras
-was protected from US wrath by the reagan administration
Bush HAS to deal with this
-when he doesn't deal with him, it gives rise to the 'wimp factor'
the reason that the US had to dispose of noriega was not because he was a dictator
-this isn't really that much of a problem, as long as he's a US puppet
-the problem was that he was becoming irrational
-irrationality CANNOT be tolerated around the panama canal
Operation Just Cause
originally operation 'blue spoon', they didnt think that this'd be macho enough
-essentially the US rolled over noriega
-beat the living FUCK out of his regime, installed a legit government in its place
-UN 'deplored' the action, passed toothless resolutions against it
Saddam Hussein
Douchebag dictator
Jimmy carter made several things clear about the middle east
-energy dependence on the middle east was established, called the gulf a 'US security interest'
-any aggression into the persian gulf would be seen as an assault on US interests
-this was clearly to be applied to the soviet union
-extended to apply to even indigenous militias and armies
first war in the region was the iran/iraq war
-1980-88
-one of the bloodiest wars post-wwii
-iraqi forces under saddam decided to invade iran in an imperialistic war
-launched against the revolutionary islamic iranian government
-iran fucks up the iraqis (FUCK YOU, IRAQI BITCHES, DONT MESS WITH IRAN), launches a counter-invasion
-reagan decided that iran's revolutionary doctrine could not be spread across the middle east
-decided to support the Iraqis in the war
-supplied them with everything short of guns
-even turned a blind eye to iraqi poison gas use
-when the Iranians decided to attack oil tankers leaving the gulf, the US provided escort ships
-Operation Praying Mantis essentially immobilized the entire persian navy
-US goals were achieved- stalemate in the middle east
problem here
-saddam interpreted this action by the US as a tacit approval of Iraqi actions
-decides to invade kuwait as a measure to recoup his losses
-doesn't realize that the US won't tolerate iraqi domination of the region any more than iranian
Operation Desert Storm
bush goes to the security council, gets a resolution
-biggest victory for collective security
-DOESNT make the mistakes truman, johnson, nixon, etc did
-not symmetric response, not micromanagement
-MASSIVE RESPONSE, let the generals do the fighting
-huge victory for the US
-end of the vietnam syndrome?
Mohammed Farah Aidid
NOPE
aidid was the local warlord
huge humanitarian crisis, US needs to intervene?
-now US foreign policy isn't driven by security interests anymore
-US security is assured, now humanitarian needs are driving policy
-baaaad idea
-terrible because US interests here didn't actually run very deep
-the public forgets why it cares very quickly
Powell Doctrine
Colin Powell- chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
-powell didn't want to send troops to yugoslavia, bosnia, or somalia
-however, wanted to send troops into europe LESS
-thought it was more dangerous
powell doctrine, you have to satisfy 3 criteria
-sufficient force, defined mission
-clear rules of engagement (you HAVE to express any limitations)
-clearly defined exit strategy
these applied in desert storm, powell thought they applied in somalia as well
other people didn't think so
-national security council had problems with the plan
-once the US forces are committed, nothing indigenous would develop to ensure their own security
-US mission would have to expand
-this is called MISSION CREEP
Mission Creep
this actually happened
-Handover from US to UN forces took much longer than expected, because of exactly those concerns
-one of the problems was that the UN SecGen had other agendas as well
-nation-building was one of his objectives
-this was NOT one of america's initial goals
-this is a PROBLEM
-nothing was working in the nation-building process

once US helicopter gunships attacked the headquarters of Aidid, somalian forces mobilized against the US
-this was ANOTHER PROBLEM
-mission creep is leading to open-ended commitment

october 3, 1993
-Black Hawk Down happened
-even though this was essentially just a tiny skirmish, it was blown way out of proportion
-PICTURES were being shown
-where before, the pictures were of starving somalis, they changed to pictures of jeering crowds dragging american bodies through the streets
-US policymakers reacted real quick, got the fuck out
-'multilateralism DIED on the streets of Mogadishu'

now, america's overriding goal is to avoid these sorts of multilateral operations that involve mission creep
C) Bill Clinton

Rwanda
April-July 1994
-in about 100 days, 800,000 people (mostly Tutsis) were slaughtered by ethnic Hutus
-many by machete
-in the wake of the Somalian debacle, there is NO PUSHING FOR US INTERVENTION
-this was deliberately suppressed by the administration, because clinton didn't want to reject plans because there was NO DOMESTIC SUPPORT
-UN tried to get troops there, but it was far too late
-US held up deliveries of APCs to the UN, etc
-Clinton administration blacklisted the word 'genocide', because if it was 'genocide' then the US had treaty obligations to fulfill

the conflict spread to nearby Congo, sparked the 1st and 2nd congolese wars
-more than 3.8 million people were killed
-essentially NO MEDIA COVERAGE of this, no intervention

Jean-Bertrand Aristid
1st elected president of Haiti
-took office Feb 1991
-overthrown by a coup in september 1991
-another warlord, military junta establishes itself in Haiti
people are trying to escape haiti, fleeing to the United States
-Clinton administration was forced to act, it's within the monroe doctrine
-aborted an invasion at the last second because of diplomatic initiatives by jimmy carter
-even so, it still hasn't quieted down in Haiti, still in a destructive cycle
Slobodan Milosevic
Yugoslavia was a bigass problem
-split into serbia and croatia, both of which wanted bosnia
milosevic was the president of Serbia
-pushed for a bigger serbia
-serb nationalists within bosnia and croatia commit themselves to 'ethnic cleansing'
-decided to kill off all the croats

Sarajevo -> Srebrenica
key components of serb ethnic cleansing were the siege of sarajevo and taking of srebrenica
-srebrenica had its security GUARANTEED by international forces
-serbs just beat the shit out of the forces, slaughtered all the men
Kosovo
Croats finally regrouped, fucked up the serbs
-US uses a private firm to rebuild the croat military
-MPRI, a company made up of former US generals and officers
-croats launch OPERATION STORM, fuck up the serb army
once the serbs made the mistake of shelling a marketplace, the US could get into the war too
-US-led NATO forces begin a strategic bombing campaign that runs from August 30-September 20
-bombed the serbs to the negotiating table
-negotiated in Dayton, Ohio (Dayton Accords)
-signed in december
still problematic- KOSOVO
-over 90% ethnic albanians, even though its part of serbia
-the serbs keep repressing the albanians
-KLA forms- Kosovo Liberation Army
-this puts pressure on the western powers to resolve the issue

Rambouillet Accords
proposed in 1989 by american, UK delegations
-NATO peacekeeping in the region
-NATO peacekeeping of Kosovo especially
-unhindered access by NATO forces to serbia
-immunity from the local law for NATO forces

Milosevic rejects them, hopes that Russia will intervene on his behalf, like russia traditionally has
-rejected on 24 march
-bombing campaign begins 11 June
-OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
-this was NOT approved by the UNSC
-even though NATO is supposed to be a DEFENSIVE alliance, the US was using NATO to advance offensive policy interests

there were even more PROBLEMS
-not enough aircraft to launch bombing runs
-MASSIVE opposition from every NATO capital against sending ground troops in
-General Wesley Clark felt that he was being denied support, etc
-was reduced to 'tank plinking'- attacking ONLY explicitly military targets instead of power plants, industrial plants, etc
-NATO was finally authorized to take the fight to belgrade (capital of serbia)
-smart weapons fucked the shit out of belgrade, even though they missed a couple times (destroyed chinese embassy)
-over $480 million spent on bringing in apache helicopters, then when 2 crashed in training they recalled them all

even though this was a massive success, not a single soldier lost, the US people were still dissatisfied with US performance for some reason.

Raamin Mostaghimi
AFP Section Writing
April 4, 2007

Henry Kissinger's "Vietnam: The Extrication"

I've never before read any real analysis on the process of withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, so what I read here was extremely interesting to me. I had always just assume that Nixon was elected to get America out of Vietnam and that's essentially what he did. Kissinger's depiction of the massive intransigence of the Vietnamese negotiators and their eventual acceptance of American Capitulation was quite telling. I think I'd fallen into the same trap that Kissinger writes the American people had fallen into- seeing the North Vietnamese as a traditional enemy. It's just not the same when the enemy can rely on the fact that deadlock, although not bringing them victory directly, will affect your domestic political dynamic in such a way so as to bring them eventual victory. The North Vietnamese strategists were extremely intelligent in this regard, and their strategy clearly paid off in the end.
The other thing which I had never even considered was Nixon's supposed nobility in the prosecution of the Vietnam War. Although I assume that this is colored in large part by Kissinger's personal affiliation with Nixon, it still seems like the facts are at least a little in Nixon's favor. His shouldering of the burden of the war was an interesting choice for an American Executive, especially at this period in American history where the rest of the political machine was concentrating on short-term victories against the other branches. Nixon decided to bite the harm of Vietnamization rather than passing the buck to Congress supposedly because he felt that the executive was responsible for assuring American security, whether the people liked it or not.

AFP NOTES 4/3
sorry, missed the last lecture. lets see if baia, lazer, and danielle can put some halfway decent notes together for us...
Lecture 19: The End of the Cold War

A) Carter, 1977-81
a 'new, fresh approach to foreign policy'
Human Rights
-made 'decency and optimism' guiding lights of foreign policy
-human rights come to the forefront here
-hoped to promote human rights in the soviet union while maintaining detente
-essentially does exactly the wrong thing
-SENDS MIXED SIGNALS
-geopolitical arena turns right against us, lowest point of american prestige was in 1979
-there was the second oil shock in the decade during the iranian revolution
-sets off a spiral of stagflation
-this was the 'malaise' period of american history

"Crisis of Confidence"
-that's essentially what this time was
-nicaraguan rebels take control against US will and wish
The Hostage Crisis
-november, iranians seize american embassy in tehran
Afghanistan
-december, soviets invade afghanistan
-this is the FIRST overt soviet expansion in 30 years
-july 1979, americans start funding afghan rebels
-END of detente
-immediately placed sanctions on USSR, withdrew from the olympics in moscow
-most importantly, starts funding the mujaheddin fighters in afghanistan
-not surprisingly, carter loses the election
B) Reagan, 1981-89
-not seen as any sort of significant figure
-people were underestimating him his entire political career, he played on this
-when he took office, soviet union was on a roll
-however, beneath the facade it was essentially a paper tiger
-extremely fragile, people realized this
-for many reasons, people were DELIBERATELY overestimating the soviet threat
-people like the CIA, 'committee on the present danger' (a private anti-soviet group), etc
-lots of pressure of the US to take on the soviets
-however, some people such as the marshall group realized that the soviets were faltering
-soviet command economy was failing due to fall of oil prices (1982 essentially), subsidization of satellite states, etc
-as much as 1/3 of soviet GDP was being spent on military expenditures, this is NOT SUSTAINABLE
-even under reagan, with massive defense spending, US doesnt spend more than 6%
-CIA overestimates soviet industrial capacity by 90% in the 70s, and 200% in 1980-85
-strategy now became 'cost imposing strategy'
-now, instead of backing off with detente, US has to press EVERYWHERE
-individual victories and defeats are IRRELEVANT
-this is a war of attrition now
-the plan is to out-spend the soviet union
-we can afford to fight war longer than the soviets
-eventually, the soviets would arrive at a tipping point and lose

3-pronged of the Reagan strategy
-direct confrontation
-massive arms buildup
-proxy war in the 3rd world
-win the wars there, force engagement around the world
-war of ideas
-maintain moral superiority, win the hearts and minds
Arms Race

The Brezhnev Doctrine
-if any country had gone socialist or entered the soviet bloc, soviets claim the right to intervene to put down counter-insurgencies
The Reagan Doctrine
-US asserts its right to intervene to help ANY nation win its freedom which wants to
Solidarity
-trade movement arises in poland, wants freedom here
-soviets CRUSH these poor fuckers
-US can do nothing about it, because it's clearly in the soviet bloc in europe
-the real war is being fought in the third world
-much more flexibility here

'the soviet union is behind all the unrest around the world' - reagan
-reagan says that the soviet union is the source of 'all the evil around the world'
-this is the source of the label 'evil empire'
NSDD 75
there are some problems now
-seems like containment had failed
-soviet union is expanding throughout the 3rd world
-there's little possibility for expansion of confrontation to the nuclear level, because they're proxy wars
-reagan doctrine therefore says essentially, we'll help you, under three conditions

these conditions are:
1) indigenous democratic resistance
2) against a 'soviet client state'
3) with a population denied representation within its own government (illegitimate government)
under those criteria, reagan doctrine will be applied

now, the reagan doctrine's being used to rebut soviet moves in afghanistan
-policy of ROLLBACK
-3 main groups of people with regards to roll back
-advocates
-wooooo rollback
-pragmatists
-evaluate on a case-by-case basis, make sure we can win every single time
-opponents
-only use it in the face of overt soviet aggression

Contras
resistance movement fighting the Sandinista rule in Nicaragua
Boland Amendment
-places a band on military support to the contras in 1984
-private sector begins secretly providing funds
-allows the CIA to covertly provide funds to the contras
-says that they're the moral equivalent to our revolution
-uses the funds gained from this to try and pay the iranians for giving back the hostages
the only real time that the reagan doctrine won out was afghanistan
-however, people believed the soviet empire was a 'house of cards'
-win one, and they all fall down
-there was a broad support in congress for the mujaheddin resistance
-97-3 in senate, 100% in the house
Stinger Missiles
this one technology became decisive in the war
-no longer could the soviets dominate by use of helicopter and low-level bombing
-high-level bombing is essentially useless against the guerillas
-US aid goes up to $650 million in 1987
-back down to $350 million in 1988
-essentially, the stinger missiles broke the back of the soviet invasion
-feb 1988, soviets announced they were withdrawing from afghanistan
C) "Star Wars"
Reagan rejected the balance of power theory
-Mutually Assured Destruction was bullshit to him
-also thought that SALT was BS, all it did was institutionalize MAD
-his long-term objective is the REDUCTION of nuclear arms
-force the soviet union into economic collapse by overspending, force them to reduce their arms themselves

START

SDI
Strategic Defense Initiative
-plans to protect america from the nuclear threat
-this was a problem for our allies
-if the US and Soviet Union both had their own SDI, any nuclear war would just destroy the rest of the world
-Soviets were like oh shit
-started the policy of SWARMING or MIRVing
-just shoot more missiles than the US can shoot down
-this, however is EXTREMELY expensive
-if SDI ever worked out, the balance of power was decisively shifted in the USs favor
-most effective point of the SDI was the psychological war being waged
-Soviets were so frightened that the US could get this then they'd just flip out
-soviets realized they couldn't build one
-americans actually couldn't build on either, but they succeeded in shanking the soviets
-lol hax. noobs.

reagan believed that the strategy of detente had failed
-soviets could be taken down if its population turned against it
-there was a strategy for making this happen
-challenging legitimacy
-superiority over parity
-fight the war from a position of superiority
-capitalizing on human rights rather than compromising
-no more mr. nice guy
-work with liberalizing, nationalist forces


Reykjavik
what is he doing with this lecture? fuck you, outline!

D) The War of Ideas

Mikhail Gorbachev
gorbachev wants to REFORM communism
-throw off the old shackles of stalinism
-starts two main reforms, perestroika and glastnost
-he and reagan hit it off right away
-gorbachev realizes that the Soviet Union could not afford to fight the arms race
-they kept one-upping eachother during negotiations so much that they actually considered disarming eachother ENTIRELY
-another aspect was that the Soviets could NOT keep funding all of these satellite states
-so he just stopped
-berlin falls, third world and all the proxy states collapse
-problem with Gorbachev's reforms was that the Soviet Union just couldn't handle it
-USSR collapses
-gorbachev sincerely believed that they could compete, but the system just wouldnt take it
-soviet union collapses
Perestroika

Glasnost


GG, SOVIET NOOBS!!

AFP NOTES 4/2

big thanks to baia for these

1. Richard nixon, 1969-71

2. Nsa - SoS of henry kissinger

3. Vietnamization

4. Le duc tho

5. Easter offensive

6. Linebacker (may 9th->october 23, 1972)

7. Nguyen van thieu

8. Linebacker II (december 18-29, 1972)

9. Paris peace accords (jan 27, 1973)

2. Nixon boctrine

1. Shanhai doctine

2. Linkage

3. Anti balistic missile treaty

4. Salt I

5. Basic principles

Paris peace accords, drag out for months. Essentially meaningless

Back channel negotiations between kissinger and tho.

Secret bombings in 1969

Incursion in 1970

Pitiful helpless giant concept

Khmer rouge, 195 pol pot

Communist marxism

Annihilation of 1/5 of the country

Oct 8th, 1972 - DMZ on the border

B-52s

Nixon doctrine

Unless on state came into threat from nukes, US is is going to expect the problem will be handled by Asian nations themselves. Allys take burden of own defense, and has a right to expect this

Bi polarity and a world of hierarchy into a world of multi-polarity

Recognition of the process of relative decline since 2nd world war

US, USSR, western Europe, japan, china

Conceptual coherecnce

Centralization of power

Balance of powe "even balance"

Mutual interest" a relaist accomadation of conflicting interests

Improving cyno-american relations key to US v. USSR relations

Only nixon could go to china?

Cant leave china forever outside the family of nations

Warning soviet union US would not remain neutral of a USSR invasion of china

Flew to china in 1972

Moved china from enemy in isolation to defacto alliance against USSR in less than 4 years

Flanked by NATO and China

Soviet union sought relaxation of tension with the US

Cost benefit relation to nixon's actions was overwhelming in US benefits

A triumph of pure politics over ideology

Linkage - cooperation of one area linking with change in another

Used the help as leverage against soviet policy

Salt - freezes ICBM's at 1972 level

ABM treat - MAD concept - mutually assured destruction

Terms have changed

US dominance til relative parady with soviet union

Consciousness of our limits is a recognition of the necessity of peace

AMERICAN PRESIDENCY REVIEW SHEET FOR MIDTERM 2

woot. thanks chris for the help. i bet you can tell which ones are hiiiiis... hahahahha
1) How did changes in the nominating process diminish the role of parties in the selection of major party candidates?

-Heyday of party selection of presidential candidates- 1800-1824 (King Caucus)
-caucus of congressmen from the party would select presidential candidates
-led to the rise of CABINET GOVERNMENT
-problem here was weak, indecisive presidency
-governors, senators dominate the field
-party is EXTREMELY influential
-Rise of jacksonian democracy
-control of presidential candidacy given to state parties rather than the national organization
-party nominating convention becomes king
-presidency was no longer cabinet-dominated
-problem here was that corruption ran rampant
-a few hundred men were all that held actual control over the entire process
-what the party wants is not a good president but a good candidate
-governors and senators continue to dominate the field
-party is still extremely influential, however state parties have much more control and influence now
-Primary and caucus system goes into effect
-much more direct representation of the electorate
-party no longer can be effectively controlled by 'bosses'
-now direct appeals to the people are necessary
-after McGovern-Fraser act, parties are required to either hold primaries or open caucuses
-electorate now sends candidates to the nation, rather than political bosses
-now, politicians can run for president without the support of a single party politician
-direct appeals to the people now allow for 'outsider' candidates
-this is an extremely effective strategy, btw
-this system disadvantages cabinet secretaries from running, as well as senators for some reason
-less people with cemented, vested interests in the party are now in the playing field
-essentially, gives the party apparatus less control over the selection of candidates
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power

2) How does the front-loading of presidential primaries affect the nominating process?

-Candidates are forced through a massive, grueling nominating process
-makes nominating and campaign seasons even longer than they were before
-skews candidate selection economically
-advantages candidates with the ability to raise huge amounts of money extremely quickly
-skews candidate selection demographically
-iowa and new hampshire are predominantly white, while the rest of the country isn't
-the iowa and NH primary and caucus are populated by people more radical than the rest of the population
-people who vote in the primaries are more ideologically charged than the rest of the population
GET MORE ON THIS QUESTION
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"

3) How does the switch to primaries and caucuses changed the type of candidates who frequently win the nomination?

-demographic change
-the people who vote in primaries are much more radical than rank-and-file party member
-appeal to electorate
-now, emphasis is on good CANDIDATE, not necessarily good PRESIDENT
-key example here is John Kerry, who people chose because they wanted to have somebody, anybody, who could beat Bush
-play to outsider appeal
-maniuplate popular resentment against washington
-being the 'political outisder' really works
-promotes individualistic, media-centered approach to presidential politics
-less substantive debate, campaigning, more 'personal' politics
-candidates' personal lives come to the forefront
-voters vote for the 'likeable' candidate, rather than the one with more governing experience
-promotes candidates with less political experience
-no more political 'peer review' by experienced members of the party who know the candidate
MORE HERE AGAIN
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"

4) How have weaker state parties and stronger national parties changed the opportunities for Presidents to function as party leaders?

-Reasons for weaker state parties:
-PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES
-this is the big one
-means that the party doesn't choose any more, the PEOPLE choose
-whether primary or caucus, now at least some of the people are selecting the presidential candidates
-CORRUPTION, people fed up with it
-McGovern-Fraser act
-Consequences
-now, state parties and leaders thereof are effectively marginalized
-you can't win with just the support of the state parties any more
-in fact, you can win WIHTOUT their explicit support
-opportunities created-
-direct appeals to the people
-ascension to the candidacy through simply strong turnout at election time
-stronger national parties mean massively modernized methods of electioneering
-parties now have to be much, much more organized
-presidents are less indebted to the party structure
-sets the stage for a split between the presidency and the party
-candidates who don't see themselves as elected by the party don't feel indebted to it in any way
-no party constraint on presidential leadership
MORE?
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"

5) What is partisan polarization and how might it shape presidential party leadership in Congreess

-partisan polarization- less ideological division within parties

-more ideological division and less overlap between parties

-more ideologically homogeneous and coherent parties

-in unified government, president only must appeal to own party

-in divided government, president can either adopt a cross-partisan or bipartisan plan

-Congressman of opposite party, if own electoral constituency same as president’s, more likely to vote for president’s plan

MOST LIKELY CHAPTER 13

6) what is divided government and how might it shape presidential strategies for pursuing a legislative agenda?

-Divided Government
-when one party controls the legislative and the other controls the executive
-how does it shape presidential strategies for pursuing political agenda
-divided control does not necessarily force deadlock on political action, but it can if the president isn't careful
-president has to work not to be excessively partisan
-more compromise is necessary
-negotiation rises to the forefront as the driving force behind government
-president caters more to moderates of the opposite party
-would be more inclined to make concessions to get pivotal legislation passed
-more attention is paid to bargaining power and bounded efficiency
-bargaining power- the ability and cost incurred for a party to simply end negotiations
-the party with the most bargaining power is more effective at the table
-bounded efficiency- within bounds, agreements can be made that make BOTH parties better off
-this is NOT true of electoral issues, when one party gains, the other loses
-president must pick more 'crosscutting' issues - issues that affect both parties and demand response
-pushes governmental policy and execution to the moderate middle of the spectrum

TAKEN FROM Quirk and Nesmith, "Divided Government and Policymaking"

7) What difference, if any, does unified or divided government matter for legislation?

-it DOES make a difference, but not necessarily in the way people think
-the argument made by Quirk and Nesmith is that although deadlock is possible in divided gov't, it's not a necessity
-cross-cutting issues, negotiation, and collective zero-sum bargaining (all the politicians want to be re-elected) mean that action will most likely be taken
-differences are more subtle
-unified government can tend toward imperial presidency, no check on presidential authority
-presidential legislative prerogative is respected
-president is 'leader of the party' afterall
-unified government also responds to minor swings in public opinion
-divided government is not so responsive
-example, welfare reform was largely untouched by minor shifts in public opinions because of this
-relatively minor shifts in public opinion sparked major gun reform legislation during unified clinton years
-even divided gov't responds to relatively major shifts in public sentiment
-energy price ceilings in 2001 by Bush
-divided government simply means legisltive agenda becomes much more centrist
-important legislation is not necessarily quashed because of divided government
-in fact, unified and divided government have nearly identical rates of passage of important legislation
-compromise, bargaining move to the forefront
-the issues which inspire deadlock are only the most ideologically charged issues
-problems emerge when crosscutting issues are linked to ideologically charged issues
-linking deficit reduction to tax hikes, for example

TAKEN FROM Quirk and Nesmith, "Divided Government and Policymaking"

8) Why do the production demands of the press often produce news coverage of presidential policy initiatives that is negative or adversarial?

-short answer- presidential media blitzes are BAD
-when presidents try to shape news coverage, they almost always fail miserably
-example- clinton health care initiatives
-administration tries to flood the press with their point of view, their sources
-press requires fair and balanced look at the news
-as a result, they bring in more opposing experts to balance out the president's people
-economic competition creates incentives to produce 'big' or attention-getting stories
-conflict generates just this
-when the president says more, it dutifully gets reported on, but opposing experts have to get reported on too
-also, when the nature of the story is partisan, the press tends to duck it
-press tends to stay away from partisan normative evaluation
-therefore, when this sort of story presents itself, they become process stories
-process stories inspire apathy and cynicism
-now, strategy becomes the story, and presidents are derided for political maneuvering
-another reason for the failure of presidential media blitzes is their inability to sustain them
-there's no way the executive can sustain a concerted media blitz for the kind of time necessary
-years, in some cases, to get all the legislation through committee and onto the floor into debate

TAKEN FROM Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press"

9) Why do presidential efforts to shape press coverage often paradoxically result in more negative press coverage and/or adversarial press relations?

SAME AS ABOVE

-short answer- presidential media blitzes are BAD
-when presidents try to shape news coverage, they almost always fail miserably
-example- clinton health care initiatives
-administration tries to flood the press with their point of view, their sources
-press requires fair and balanced look at the news
-as a result, they bring in more opposing experts to balance out the president's people
-economic competition creates incentives to produce 'big' or attention-getting stories
-conflict generates just this
-when the president says more, it dutifully gets reported on, but opposing experts have to get reported on too
-also, when the nature of the story is partisan, the press tends to duck it
-press tends to stay away from partisan normative evaluation
-therefore, when this sort of story presents itself, they become process stories
-process stories inspire apathy and cynicism
-now, strategy becomes the story, and presidents are derided for political maneuvering
-another reason for the failure of presidential media blitzes is their inability to sustain them
-there's no way the executive can sustain a concerted media blitz for the kind of time necessary
-years, in some cases, to get all the legislation through committee and onto the floor into debate

TAKEN FROM Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press"

10) Why have formal presidential press conferences declined in relation to other kinds of public appearances by presidents?

fuck knows
i remember something in lecture?
-presidents prefer controlled circumstances to promote their agendas, rather than the adversarial media
-media isn't as nice as it was before
-better to control and regiment the information given out to the press


–press conferences cannot be pre-planned
-public appearances allow for more control over what president says and the situation as a whole

+Jacobs Ch. 5

11) How have changes in the media, such as the rise of cable, made presidential communication strategies mroe difficult?
HOLY SHIT WHAT?

12) How is OMB an important tool fo the institutional presidency?
-Office of Management and Budget

-created in 1970 under Nixon

-involved in budget making and regulatory review

-regulatory review –

-budget- allows president to decide where money is specifically spent

-regulation- allows president to oversee and control what happens within the bureaucracy

-President penetrates bureaucracy with appointees to oversee it

-regulatory review expands presidential power

+Mayer & Welco reading

13) What are some of the congressional disadvantages in dealing with the Executive Branch?
-information gap- Congress does not know all the information the president knows

-Congressmen as individuals do not always care about collective power of Congress

-President has first move advantage

-if constitution is ambiguous, president can exercise residual power rights

+Mayer & Welco reading

14) How has control over regulatory policy enabled presidents to pursue policy goals that might otherwise be frustrated by Congress?
-expanding WHS has allowed president to expand administrative power

-president can surround himself with loyalists making it so they will act in his favor

-president penetrates bureaucracy deeper

-extends oversight capacity

-can leave behind a legacy

+Mayer & Welco reading

15) How has the appointments process enabled presidents to enhance their control over the operation of Executive agencies and departments?

-shift from essentially party patronage
-used to be that the party dictated to the president who got what appointment
-starting at the very beginning with Truman, then with Kennedy/Johnson and so forth, Presidents took a much larger role in the appointments process
-allows presidents to fill the departments with people who are loyal to HIM rather than to his party
-this was a problem for nixon and reagan, but hey, whatever
-every president has done this or been forced to do this since Kennedy, or face a major crisis of lack of executive authority
-Nixon and Carter tried to do without this personalized executive
-carter especially tried to move away from the presidential appointments process, and back to the old-style system
-huuuuuge mistake
-by leaving department and cabinet heads to appoint their own people, he decentralized the presidency far too much
-appointees were loyal to the people who appointed them, not to the president or even to the president's plans
-executive authority was diluted so much that staffers were making bargains on their own behalf in congress and the like
-this was simply unacceptable
-even carter, who ran on an anti-nixon, anti-consolidation of presidential authority platform, was forced to reevaluate his policy, and change it to make it more orthodox

TAKEN FROM Mayer and Weko, "The Institutionalization of Power"

16) Why has conflict over appointments to lower Federal Courts (District and Appeals Courts) increased in recent years?
-increase in partisan polarization

-president wants to appoint loyalists to lower courts because judges have life terms

-decrease in senatorial courtesy

-appointment may be filibustered by opposition party

-court hierarchy- lower court judges have tendency to rise through federal court ranks

+Ch. 8

17) Why are judicial appointments an attractive way for presidents to create a legacy that lives on after they leave office?
this one's just common sense

-judicial appointees serve 'in good behavior'
-supreme court justices are good examples of this
-supreme court justices serve for life
-if the president gets an SC justice nominated and confirmed, he can appoint someone who is ideologically similar to him
-this means essentially that his policies are living on after his term
-even if the appointee ends up not serving for life, the term they serve is still longer than the given president will be in office
-legacy lives on

not much else to it...

18) Why is the Supreme Court usually reluctant to limit presidential prerogatives in foreign policy?

-so three possible cases for executive/legislative conflict
-explicit authorization, acquiescence, or direct conflict
-explicit authorization- where the executive has enumerated constitutional authority to do what it did
-acquiescence- where congress, although the president has no enumerated authority, has acquiesced to his actions implicitly
-direct conflict- where both executive and legislative have legitimate complaints and bases for their claims
-in the first two cases, the Court defers to the president nearly all the time, and in the third, congress has to do the pushing
-the Court won't fight Congress's battles for it
-Here's why
-even when the Congress has a legitimate claim against the Executive, they have to fight for that claim
-example- treaty termination
-congress could have necessitated its support for termination of a treaty in the terms, but it didn't
-therefore, when it started bitching about presidential authority getting out of control when carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan, the court cut it no slack
-you actually have to FIGHT for your rights
-if, on the other hand, congress actually starts fighting
-example- to invoke the war powers resolution it would have to declare hostilities in iraq extant, then pass a resolution expressing their disapproval and requesting the troops be brought home, THEN they'd go to the court and challenge the president if he didnt
-if they did this, then the court has explicitly stated that they'd be in the right
-however, the court is reluctant to fight the battles of the congress for it
-there's a reason the presidency has so much power
-it was delegated massive amounts of authority during the cold war
-these broad delegations, however inadvisable they may have been in retrospect, form the basis of precedent for the court
-the court WILL NOT make normative judgments in this arena
-it HAS TO support these laws, constitutionally, and so any broad delegation of power to the president by congress is taken into consideration as precedent-worthy

TAKEN FROM Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancements of Executive Power"

19) How might the War Powers Resolution enhance the president's powers as Commander in Chief rather than limit them?

-the War Powers Resolution can be interpreted as giving the President a 'blank check' for hostilities for 60 days, essentially
-ONLY after 60 days can congress do anything at all about the conflict
-president's been given essentially unlimited authority for those first 2 months, however
-and EVEN THEN, congress has to declare hostilities opened in the area
-THEN the clock has to run out
-THEN congress has to pass a joint resolution requiring the president to bring the troops back
-THEN the court has to uphold it (most likely)
-so here, not only is an expansion of the president's commander in chief powers explicitly given, but it's given as a result of structural problems with the system itself as well

TAKEN FROM Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancements of Executive Power"


20) How has the development of a large standing army significantly weakened congressional checks on presidential war powers?
um. no idea.

Raamin Mostaghimi

3/28/07

AFP Section Writing

Kissinger’s "Vietnam: On the Road to Despair”

Kissinger’s analysis here has, contrary to your comments last section, captivated me once again. He looks at a completely different strategy that I found interesting- using Laos as a defense point for Southern Vietnam rather than South Vietnam itself. He makes the point that the Communists were treating the whole of Indochina as a single theater of war, while the Americans for some reason had separated them along the lines arbitrarily drawn to divide them into countries. Any strategic aim that Kennedy and Johnson were looking to accomplish would have been served equally well by fighting the North Vietnamese (and especially the Viet Cong) in Laos as in South Vietnam.

That the Kennedy administration was unwilling to sacrifice the ideological component of the war in this way for a purely strategic end really illustrates a point that Kissinger has been making throughout his analysis- that the United States has fought every war post-WWII with a handicap- ideology. The North Vietnamese could have been stopped and South Vietnam possibly secured without having to pit the US military against irregular guerilla forces with which it was not prepared to deal, but US prestige was at stake as soon as Johnson was sent over to the country. Had the US not fought with ideology and prestige on the line but rather as a soldier fights- like Eisenhower had suggested- it’s possible that the quagmire that Vietnam became could have been avoided entirely.

AP NOTES 3/27

Questions 1-4
-Post 1968 reforms of delegate selection
-Front-loading of primaries
-rules of the game and candidate strategy
-structure of contemporary parties

Questions 5-7
-partisan polarization
-partisan context and presidential leadership
-divided versus unified government

Questions 8-11
-production demands of the press
-press conferences versus public appearances
-media and presidential communication

Questions 12-15
-Role of OMB in regulatory review
-Presidential appointments
-presidential advantages vis-a-vis congress

Questions 16-18
-Presidential goals and judicial appointments
-partisan conflict over judicial appointments
-judicial enhancements of executive authority

Presidential War Powers
-Collective judgment in war making
-presidential advantages in foreign policy (two presidencies thesis)

AFP NOTES 3/27

Lecture 17: The Vietnam War, 1963-1969
US thought that the vietnam was was essentially a proxy war to start
-LIMITED war
US shall 'pay any cost, bear any burden' to ensure democracy around the world

A) Kennedy (1961-63)
Kennedy made the bear any burden speech
-key strategy was 'flexible response'
-this was in contrast to the strategy of massive retaliation
-two-pronged strategy for this
-founded the peace corps, to spread US values to the third world
-founded the green berets, trained to fight in the third world against communism
kennedy thought SE asia was key in the war against communism
-US stakes its prestige on the survival and success of S.Vietnam
big difference between kennedy and eisenhower
-eisenhower thought of vietnam as a military conflict
-kennedy put it into the context of the cold war, politicized it
-kennedy was really reluctant to commit ground forces, sent lots of advisors instead
US is willing to work with basically any sort of government as long as it wasnt communist
-military regimes and coups were supported
-'puppet regimes'
-south vietnamese people weren't willing to stand up for this government
Ngo Dinh Diem
puppet leader, assassinated
-ironically, JFK was assassinated just 3 weeks later
Ngo Dinh Nhu

B) Lyndon Johnson (1963-69)
comes to power after JFK is assassinated
-puts vietnam securely in the realm of US historical response
-'whenever the US had stood firm against aggression, it has been turned back'
-appeasement DOESNT WORK (look at hitler)
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
empowered the president to protect against ANY attack on US or SEATO forces
-SEATO- southeast asia treaty organization
-essentially a blank check for force
-SEATO is NEATO (props to evan)

Sec of Def McNamara
symmetric response was put into play here
-low grade nuclear weapons to be used to defoliate vietnam were considered, rejected as extreme
-meet aggression with matching defense
several things were considered when making airstrikes above the DMZ
-advantage gained by making the strikes
-risk incurred to planes and pilots
-danger of widening the conflict (china enters? oh shit)
-civilian casualties (baaaaaaad pr)
essentially the first time that the white house had micromanaged the war effort anywhere
airstrikes escalated during the war
-25,000 sorties flown in 1965, 108,000 in 67
-63,000 tons of bombs dropped in 65, 226,000 in 67
-scope of strikes escalated as well
-ended up encompassing even civilian infrastructure
-troop commitment shot up as well
-from 184,000 in 65 to 486,000 in 67
unfortunately, graduated response and 'calibration' DIDNT WORK in vietnam
-with the soviet union, perhaps it would have worked against nuclear holocaust
-EXCEPT the VC weren't the soviets
-only calibration and symmetrical response was interpreted as WEAKNESS rather than resolve
-gives the initiative to the VC
VC works out that the US really wants to negotiate
-drags out the conflict as long as possible
-keeps demanding more concessions
-johnson modifies negotiation policies
-starts suspending bombing during negotiation
-refuses to talk to the individual leaders of the national liberation front, waffles here, ends up accepting them as a legit political party
-longer the VC keep up the war, the better the terms are for them
US is locked into old-school strategy of search and destroy
-set piece battles just WERENT HAPPENING
-guerrilla war was just DIFFERENT
Sec of State Rusk
Nat Sec Advisor Rostow
Tet Offensive
VC offensive
-full-scale assault on the lunar new year
-attacked 30 vietnamese cities
-actually controlled one of them for 25 days
-most poignant image was that the US embassy at saigon was actually breeched for a time
-there was a huge loss of confidence and credibility for the johnson administration
irony here was that the Tet Offensive was basically a failure
-the south vietnamese weren't willing to rise up as the VC had expected
-the VietCong was basically wiped out
-N.Vietnamese regular army forces had to bear the brunt of the fighting
-N.Vietnamese are actually LOSING
-the american people didn't perceive it that way, though
-THATS why the US was losing
US general was asking for additional 200,000 troops, denied because the US just didn't have them
Johnson just doesn't run for reelection
the election was essentially a referendum on the war
-democratic nominees were bobby kennedy (assassinated), mcCarthy (lost), and johnson's VP (won the nomination)
-all lost to Richard Nixon. woot republican president
the chief purpose of the US in vietnam was CREDIBILITY
-US credibility as an ally on the international stage
-the problem was the strategy used by the superpowers
-korea, vietnam, afghanistan, etc were not contested because they were important, they were important because they were contested
-this is a problem
-there could not be any incursion in europe
-boundaries are far too clearly defined
-any incursion there would lead to nuclear conflict
-conflicts had to happen in the third world, where the borders were looser
-inspired the 'vietnam syndrome'
-any subsequent war was criticized as 'another vietnam'
-the real irony here was that the vietnam war actually shot our credibility to hell
-confirmed to other rebellions around the world that vietnam-esque tactics would work against the US
-another massive problem was that the s.vietnamese people would NOT stand up and fight for themselves
-korean people would, this is part of the reason why korea wasnt as big a failure
-all the american money POURING into vietnam destroyed the vietnamese economy

OCC CIV QUIZ QUESTIONS 3/26

1. What was the logic underlying the form of aid offered through the
Marshall Plan?

-the Marshall Plan, was the primary plan of the US to not only help rebuild the European Allies, but also help prevent another rise of Communism after WWII. The US, over a time span of four years, gave around 13 billion dollars to Europe in hopes of providing both economical and technical assistance. The plan offered the same form of assistance to the Soviet Union and its allies, but only if they agreed to certain terms and reforms set by the US. This plan was successful in rebuilding the destroyed economies of most of the European allies. The US’s logic behind this plan was to gain trust and alliance from European countries in hopes of a.) preventing communism and b.) gaining allies who would help them prevent communism should a country decide to revert back to it.

2. Describe the "path to Communism" of one Eastern or Central European
country. In what ways was this representative of the path taken by other
states in the postwar period?

-Poland devastated during WWII, Red Army occupied the country during WWII, crushed any resistance to Communism, US offered the Marshall Plan to Poland, but under pressure from Moscow, they declined and it becomes a satellite state for the Soviet Union, they decided not to claim reparations from other countries bc they were forced by the soviet Union, Soviet Union also helped rebuild Poland as part of the Warsaw Pact, due to heavy Soviet influence, Poland became Communist

-representative because communism shows up with heavy backing from the Soviet Union, it is the only way that it showed up in other countries because Bolshevism was contained within Russia after WWI, so communism could not spread naturally without force

3. Who were defined as Nazi collaborators after the war and how were they
treated?
what was a collaborator: p.44
and then that goes to about page 55 and 56

AFP NOTES 3/26

Lecture 16: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
point of the most confrontation between US and USSR
both are acting solely on their perceptions of the other country
-both are acting based on their own assumptions based on their own experiences
-Khruschev thought he was acting DEFENSIVELY
-Kennedy believed that khruschev was acting OFFENSIVELY
-violation of the monroe doctrine, america's defense perimeter
-Castro was acting in the framework of historical US-Cuban relations
BIGGEST PROBLEM in this situation:
-MIRROR IMAGING
-assuming that others see the world the way they do
-fail to anticipate actions, reactions, based on DIFFERING experiences
-acting on the assumption that reactions will be predictable, when they're NOT based on given information
CUBA is a dependency of US interests
-US owns 80% of the utilities, 90% of the mining, and 40% of the sugar industry in cuba
-it's as close to an entirely criminally organized state as it gets

A) Cuba: Khruschev vs. Kennedy (1961-63)

Batista -> Castro
Castro leads rebellion against corrupt batista
-began as small rebellion, grows rapidly
-not initially soviet or communist
US cuts off sugar imports from Cuba
-soviets move in and buy up all the excess
-eventually (october, 1959), soviets declare solidarity with cuba
Cuba becomes the first soviet satellite state outside the defensive perimeter
-first satellite state inside the US sphere of influence

Bay of Pigs
One of JFK's first acts was to authorize the bay of pigs invasion
-plan to land cuban exiles in the bay of pigs, spark revolution
-kennedy withheld US air support
-plan FAILED miserably, was a fiasco
other sorts of pressure, economic especially
-total US embargo to cuba
Operation Mongoose, Northwoods
CIA becomes one of the largest employers in miami, taking action against cuba
NORTHWOODS
-false flag incidents
-terrorist attacks or something like that
-would say that castro did it, spark US outrage against castro, use as pretext to go to war
-even would risk US civilian lives
OPLAN 312, OPLAN 314
full-scale invasion plans
-came back to haunt administration during the missile crisis
-when it came to the cuban missile crisis, there were no small, flexible plans to use
Operation Quick Kick
Lantphibex 1-62
-two US invasion plans
-Soviets estimated that cubans would last approx. 1 week against US assault
-they thought cuba would need some sort of deterrence as defense

other problems soviets had with US included BERLIN
-there was a huge brain drain from the soviets into west berlin
-hope was that by taking a similar action- popping a small redoubt inside the US defense perimeter, attention would be taken away from berlin, soviets could take it
another issue- TURKEY
-US had just placed MRBMs in turkey, on the border with soviets
-soviets hoped that US would remove these in exchange for them removing nukes in cuba
China
-hope was that this issue would cement Soviet supremacy over china (was this ever in question?)
Cold War politics
-soviets look tough, neutral states move towards their position
Domestic Politics
-lots of domestic programs were failing
-khruschev thought that with a major foreign policy success, attention would be diverted
B) Operation Anadyr
this was the OFFICIAL name of the nuclear deployment to cuba
-funny thing was, if soviets put a tiny armed detachment of soviet troops in cuba, same goals would have been achieved
-same deterrence
-instead, nukes were deployed
over 50,000 troops and personnel were to be deployed
-this had to be SECRET
-85 ships were used, some with round trips
-only had 4 months for this to take effect

Missile Gap
repairing the missile gap was one of the top issues for US policymakers
-US was actually far far ahead of the soviets
-khruschev's only hope for equalizing the missile gap in soviet favor was to deploy MRBMs and IRBMs within range of US, in cuba
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

plan was to deploy 36 R-12 MRBMs, 24 R-14 IRBMs
-this can attack any target on the mainland US
-to support them-
-4 Reinforced Motorized Rifle Regiments (14,000 men)
-42 IL-28 Bombers (6 were rigged to carry nuclear bombs)
-40 MIG fighters
-all sorts of cruise missiles and such
-6 Luna tactical nuclear missiles
-4 Foxtrot class submarines, each with a nuclear torpedo
-soviets were incorporating a tactical, short range nuclear deterrent
-MASSIVE nuclear presence, much more than US had expected
so there was central control of nuclear weapons, but with the massive distance between cuba and moscow, the control was effectively unenforceable
this was MUCH more provocative than the soviets thought
-kennedy said that if there was any indication of offensive Cuban capabilities, US would act

kennedy was notified about this on Oct 16, 1962
Issa Pliyev

EXCOM
executive committee of some sort
-immediately formed in response to the cuban missile crisis
-formed of the 'best and brightest'... fucking nerds
-entirely secret and covert
-deliberating american response
problems immediately
-are the missiles operational?
-right now, US knows that soviets are deploying missiles in cuba, but the soviets dont know they know
-immediate consensus was to set up an airstrike, take out the missiles
-air force told them that they couldn't guarantee destruction of all the missiles
-if any aren't hit, they get launched back at the US
-oh shit.
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff told them this ^^
kennedy closes off the airstrike option
-embargo/quarantine was put into effect
-US sets up a massive naval blockade around cuba
-nothing else was allowed in or out
-irony here was that the reason the US went to war in WWI and WWII was because of violation of freedom of the seas
-US was curtailing other nations' freedoms here, no basis in international law
-US was flexible in its interpretation of the blockade
-allowed ships that weren't carrying arms or equipment through
-Oct 24, blockade goes into effect
-Oct 26, first ship searched
-they made sure it was a ship that wouldn't have any contraband on it
-soviet ships had stopped right up against the US naval blockade
-one ship managed to slip through
-missiles hadn't gone through, but the warheads were in cuba
-the port they went to wasn't equipped to handle nuclear weapons, however, so the nukes were effectively neutralized
-US began to shadow soviet submarines
-practiced anti-submarine tactics
-launched practice depth charges at the soviet submarines
-US didn't realize that the submarines were equipped with nuclear torpedoes, whoops. dumbasses
-then EXCOM realized that the blockade had no effect on already existing nuke sites
-nobody knows what the soviet commander would have done if an invasion had occurred
-he was told NOT to use nukes, but what if he was cut off from moscow?
-first U2 was shot down
-done by accident, not under orders from soviet commanders
-both US and soviet forces are starting to act independently, leaders are losing control
-castro begs khruschev to hit the US with whatever they have
US agreed to pull their missiles in turkey out 4-5 months after the cuban missiles were pulled out
-soviets took the deal
what were long term problems?
-marginalization
-of congress- congress was cut completely out of the loop
-of allies- castro's demands were essentially ignored
-guesswork was exposed
-HUGE errors in CIA analysis of soviet actions
-HUGE HUMAN ERRORS
-norad actually believed that it was under attack by soviet missiles from cuba due to accidental test tape insertion
-hoooooly shit.

DEFCON

Adlai Stevenson

Jupiter Missiles

whos a badass? raamin's a badass

Raamin Mostaghimi
3/21/07
AFP Section Writing

Henry Kissinger's "The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War"

Kissinger's analysis in "The Dilemma of Containment" was nothing short of incredible for me. The idea that mistakes so totally dominated the battlefield and the ensuing negotiations boggles the mind, really, especially when you consider that some of the greatest minds in the world were running the country at the time.
Douglas MacArthur's blunder before the war even started of not mentioning Korea as inside the American defense perimeter was what led the North Koreans to believe that they could take over the peninsula in the first place. After American forces were committed to Korea and MacArthur pushed the North Koreans back past the choke point of the peninsula, he made the second blunder of not stopping there and threatening the Chinese. If the administration had just made public the order to MacArthur not to go within 100 miles of the Chinese border, it's possible the Chinese would have been placated. Then, the Chinese made a mistake of their own- attempting to push the Americans entirely off the peninsula, rather than stopping after reaching the 38th parallel. If they had done that, they would have won a resounding victory in the eyes of the world, but their mistake here led to even more problems for them later on, when American forces made a huge comeback and re-established the 38th parallel themselves.
So mistake after mistake after mistake was what characterized the Korean War, and I don't know quite how I feel about that. International victories should go to the party that does the most right, not does the least wrong, but hey, I guess that's how it works when enough players enter the equation. If the US thought they were fighting a war JUST with Korea, there's no doubt that the North Koreans would have been crushed mercilessly. However, when the Chinese and the Soviets were taken into consideration, the complexity of the situation was just too great for flawless execution.