AMERICAN PRESIDENCY REVIEW SHEET FOR MIDTERM 2woot. thanks chris for the help. i bet you can tell which ones are hiiiiis... hahahahha
1) How did changes in the nominating process diminish the role of parties in the selection of major party candidates?
-Heyday of party selection of presidential candidates- 1800-1824 (King Caucus)
-caucus of congressmen from the party would select presidential candidates
-led to the rise of CABINET GOVERNMENT
-problem here was weak, indecisive presidency
-governors, senators dominate the field
-party is EXTREMELY influential
-Rise of jacksonian democracy
-control of presidential candidacy given to state parties rather than the national organization
-party nominating convention becomes king
-presidency was no longer cabinet-dominated
-problem here was that corruption ran rampant
-a few hundred men were all that held actual control over the entire process
-what the party wants is not a good president but a good candidate
-governors and senators continue to dominate the field
-party is still extremely influential, however state parties have much more control and influence now
-Primary and caucus system goes into effect
-much more direct representation of the electorate
-party no longer can be effectively controlled by 'bosses'
-now direct appeals to the people are necessary
-after McGovern-Fraser act, parties are required to either hold primaries or open caucuses
-electorate now sends candidates to the nation, rather than political bosses
-now, politicians can run for president without the support of a single party politician
-direct appeals to the people now allow for 'outsider' candidates
-this is an extremely effective strategy, btw
-this system disadvantages cabinet secretaries from running, as well as senators for some reason
-less people with cemented, vested interests in the party are now in the playing field
-essentially, gives the party apparatus less control over the selection of candidates
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power
2) How does the front-loading of presidential primaries affect the nominating process?
-Candidates are forced through a massive, grueling nominating process
-makes nominating and campaign seasons even longer than they were before
-skews candidate selection economically
-advantages candidates with the ability to raise huge amounts of money extremely quickly
-skews candidate selection demographically
-iowa and new hampshire are predominantly white, while the rest of the country isn't
-the iowa and NH primary and caucus are populated by people more radical than the rest of the population
-people who vote in the primaries are more ideologically charged than the rest of the population
GET MORE ON THIS QUESTION
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"
3) How does the switch to primaries and caucuses changed the type of candidates who frequently win the nomination?
-demographic change
-the people who vote in primaries are much more radical than rank-and-file party member
-appeal to electorate
-now, emphasis is on good CANDIDATE, not necessarily good PRESIDENT
-key example here is John Kerry, who people chose because they wanted to have somebody, anybody, who could beat Bush
-play to outsider appeal
-maniuplate popular resentment against washington
-being the 'political outisder' really works
-promotes individualistic, media-centered approach to presidential politics
-less substantive debate, campaigning, more 'personal' politics
-candidates' personal lives come to the forefront
-voters vote for the 'likeable' candidate, rather than the one with more governing experience
-promotes candidates with less political experience
-no more political 'peer review' by experienced members of the party who know the candidate
MORE HERE AGAIN
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"
4) How have weaker state parties and stronger national parties changed the opportunities for Presidents to function as party leaders?
-Reasons for weaker state parties:
-PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES
-this is the big one
-means that the party doesn't choose any more, the PEOPLE choose
-whether primary or caucus, now at least some of the people are selecting the presidential candidates
-CORRUPTION, people fed up with it
-McGovern-Fraser act
-Consequences
-now, state parties and leaders thereof are effectively marginalized
-you can't win with just the support of the state parties any more
-in fact, you can win WIHTOUT their explicit support
-opportunities created-
-direct appeals to the people
-ascension to the candidacy through simply strong turnout at election time
-stronger national parties mean massively modernized methods of electioneering
-parties now have to be much, much more organized
-presidents are less indebted to the party structure
-sets the stage for a split between the presidency and the party
-candidates who don't see themselves as elected by the party don't feel indebted to it in any way
-no party constraint on presidential leadership
MORE?
TAKEN FROM- Pious, "The Presidency and the Nominating Process: Politics and Power"
5) What is partisan polarization and how might it shape presidential party leadership in Congreess
-partisan polarization- less ideological division within parties
-more ideological division and less overlap between parties
-more ideologically homogeneous and coherent parties
-in unified government, president only must appeal to own party
-in divided government, president can either adopt a cross-partisan or bipartisan plan
-Congressman of opposite party, if own electoral constituency same as president’s, more likely to vote for president’s plan
MOST LIKELY CHAPTER 13
6) what is divided government and how might it shape presidential strategies for pursuing a legislative agenda?
-Divided Government
-when one party controls the legislative and the other controls the executive
-how does it shape presidential strategies for pursuing political agenda
-divided control does not necessarily force deadlock on political action, but it can if the president isn't careful
-president has to work not to be excessively partisan
-more compromise is necessary
-negotiation rises to the forefront as the driving force behind government
-president caters more to moderates of the opposite party
-would be more inclined to make concessions to get pivotal legislation passed
-more attention is paid to bargaining power and bounded efficiency
-bargaining power- the ability and cost incurred for a party to simply end negotiations
-the party with the most bargaining power is more effective at the table
-bounded efficiency- within bounds, agreements can be made that make BOTH parties better off
-this is NOT true of electoral issues, when one party gains, the other loses
-president must pick more 'crosscutting' issues - issues that affect both parties and demand response
-pushes governmental policy and execution to the moderate middle of the spectrum
TAKEN FROM Quirk and Nesmith, "Divided Government and Policymaking"
7) What difference, if any, does unified or divided government matter for legislation?
-it DOES make a difference, but not necessarily in the way people think
-the argument made by Quirk and Nesmith is that although deadlock is possible in divided gov't, it's not a necessity
-cross-cutting issues, negotiation, and collective zero-sum bargaining (all the politicians want to be re-elected) mean that action will most likely be taken
-differences are more subtle
-unified government can tend toward imperial presidency, no check on presidential authority
-presidential legislative prerogative is respected
-president is 'leader of the party' afterall
-unified government also responds to minor swings in public opinion
-divided government is not so responsive
-example, welfare reform was largely untouched by minor shifts in public opinions because of this
-relatively minor shifts in public opinion sparked major gun reform legislation during unified clinton years
-even divided gov't responds to relatively major shifts in public sentiment
-energy price ceilings in 2001 by Bush
-divided government simply means legisltive agenda becomes much more centrist
-important legislation is not necessarily quashed because of divided government
-in fact, unified and divided government have nearly identical rates of passage of important legislation
-compromise, bargaining move to the forefront
-the issues which inspire deadlock are only the most ideologically charged issues
-problems emerge when crosscutting issues are linked to ideologically charged issues
-linking deficit reduction to tax hikes, for example
TAKEN FROM Quirk and Nesmith, "Divided Government and Policymaking"
8) Why do the production demands of the press often produce news coverage of presidential policy initiatives that is negative or adversarial?
-short answer- presidential media blitzes are BAD
-when presidents try to shape news coverage, they almost always fail miserably
-example- clinton health care initiatives
-administration tries to flood the press with their point of view, their sources
-press requires fair and balanced look at the news
-as a result, they bring in more opposing experts to balance out the president's people
-economic competition creates incentives to produce 'big' or attention-getting stories
-conflict generates just this
-when the president says more, it dutifully gets reported on, but opposing experts have to get reported on too
-also, when the nature of the story is partisan, the press tends to duck it
-press tends to stay away from partisan normative evaluation
-therefore, when this sort of story presents itself, they become process stories
-process stories inspire apathy and cynicism
-now, strategy becomes the story, and presidents are derided for political maneuvering
-another reason for the failure of presidential media blitzes is their inability to sustain them
-there's no way the executive can sustain a concerted media blitz for the kind of time necessary
-years, in some cases, to get all the legislation through committee and onto the floor into debate
TAKEN FROM Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press"
9) Why do presidential efforts to shape press coverage often paradoxically result in more negative press coverage and/or adversarial press relations?
SAME AS ABOVE
-short answer- presidential media blitzes are BAD
-when presidents try to shape news coverage, they almost always fail miserably
-example- clinton health care initiatives
-administration tries to flood the press with their point of view, their sources
-press requires fair and balanced look at the news
-as a result, they bring in more opposing experts to balance out the president's people
-economic competition creates incentives to produce 'big' or attention-getting stories
-conflict generates just this
-when the president says more, it dutifully gets reported on, but opposing experts have to get reported on too
-also, when the nature of the story is partisan, the press tends to duck it
-press tends to stay away from partisan normative evaluation
-therefore, when this sort of story presents itself, they become process stories
-process stories inspire apathy and cynicism
-now, strategy becomes the story, and presidents are derided for political maneuvering
-another reason for the failure of presidential media blitzes is their inability to sustain them
-there's no way the executive can sustain a concerted media blitz for the kind of time necessary
-years, in some cases, to get all the legislation through committee and onto the floor into debate
TAKEN FROM Jacobs, "The Presidency and the Press"
10) Why have formal presidential press conferences declined in relation to other kinds of public appearances by presidents?
fuck knows
i remember something in lecture?
-presidents prefer controlled circumstances to promote their agendas, rather than the adversarial media
-media isn't as nice as it was before
-better to control and regiment the information given out to the press
–press conferences cannot be pre-planned
-public appearances allow for more control over what president says and the situation as a whole
+Jacobs Ch. 5
11) How have changes in the media, such as the rise of cable, made presidential communication strategies mroe difficult?
HOLY SHIT WHAT?
12) How is OMB an important tool fo the institutional presidency?
-Office of Management and Budget
-created in 1970 under Nixon
-involved in budget making and regulatory review
-regulatory review –
-budget- allows president to decide where money is specifically spent
-regulation- allows president to oversee and control what happens within the bureaucracy
-President penetrates bureaucracy with appointees to oversee it
-regulatory review expands presidential power
+Mayer & Welco reading
13) What are some of the congressional disadvantages in dealing with the Executive Branch?
-information gap- Congress does not know all the information the president knows
-Congressmen as individuals do not always care about collective power of Congress
-President has first move advantage
-if constitution is ambiguous, president can exercise residual power rights
+Mayer & Welco reading
14) How has control over regulatory policy enabled presidents to pursue policy goals that might otherwise be frustrated by Congress?
-expanding WHS has allowed president to expand administrative power
-president can surround himself with loyalists making it so they will act in his favor
-president penetrates bureaucracy deeper
-extends oversight capacity
-can leave behind a legacy
+Mayer & Welco reading
15) How has the appointments process enabled presidents to enhance their control over the operation of Executive agencies and departments?
-shift from essentially party patronage
-used to be that the party dictated to the president who got what appointment
-starting at the very beginning with Truman, then with Kennedy/Johnson and so forth, Presidents took a much larger role in the appointments process
-allows presidents to fill the departments with people who are loyal to HIM rather than to his party
-this was a problem for nixon and reagan, but hey, whatever
-every president has done this or been forced to do this since Kennedy, or face a major crisis of lack of executive authority
-Nixon and Carter tried to do without this personalized executive
-carter especially tried to move away from the presidential appointments process, and back to the old-style system
-huuuuuge mistake
-by leaving department and cabinet heads to appoint their own people, he decentralized the presidency far too much
-appointees were loyal to the people who appointed them, not to the president or even to the president's plans
-executive authority was diluted so much that staffers were making bargains on their own behalf in congress and the like
-this was simply unacceptable
-even carter, who ran on an anti-nixon, anti-consolidation of presidential authority platform, was forced to reevaluate his policy, and change it to make it more orthodox
TAKEN FROM Mayer and Weko, "The Institutionalization of Power"
16) Why has conflict over appointments to lower Federal Courts (District and Appeals Courts) increased in recent years?
-increase in partisan polarization
-president wants to appoint loyalists to lower courts because judges have life terms
-decrease in senatorial courtesy
-appointment may be filibustered by opposition party
-court hierarchy- lower court judges have tendency to rise through federal court ranks
+Ch. 8
17) Why are judicial appointments an attractive way for presidents to create a legacy that lives on after they leave office?
this one's just common sense
-judicial appointees serve 'in good behavior'
-supreme court justices are good examples of this
-supreme court justices serve for life
-if the president gets an SC justice nominated and confirmed, he can appoint someone who is ideologically similar to him
-this means essentially that his policies are living on after his term
-even if the appointee ends up not serving for life, the term they serve is still longer than the given president will be in office
-legacy lives on
not much else to it...
18) Why is the Supreme Court usually reluctant to limit presidential prerogatives in foreign policy?
-so three possible cases for executive/legislative conflict
-explicit authorization, acquiescence, or direct conflict
-explicit authorization- where the executive has enumerated constitutional authority to do what it did
-acquiescence- where congress, although the president has no enumerated authority, has acquiesced to his actions implicitly
-direct conflict- where both executive and legislative have legitimate complaints and bases for their claims
-in the first two cases, the Court defers to the president nearly all the time, and in the third, congress has to do the pushing
-the Court won't fight Congress's battles for it
-Here's why
-even when the Congress has a legitimate claim against the Executive, they have to fight for that claim
-example- treaty termination
-congress could have necessitated its support for termination of a treaty in the terms, but it didn't
-therefore, when it started bitching about presidential authority getting out of control when carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan, the court cut it no slack
-you actually have to FIGHT for your rights
-if, on the other hand, congress actually starts fighting
-example- to invoke the war powers resolution it would have to declare hostilities in iraq extant, then pass a resolution expressing their disapproval and requesting the troops be brought home, THEN they'd go to the court and challenge the president if he didnt
-if they did this, then the court has explicitly stated that they'd be in the right
-however, the court is reluctant to fight the battles of the congress for it
-there's a reason the presidency has so much power
-it was delegated massive amounts of authority during the cold war
-these broad delegations, however inadvisable they may have been in retrospect, form the basis of precedent for the court
-the court WILL NOT make normative judgments in this arena
-it HAS TO support these laws, constitutionally, and so any broad delegation of power to the president by congress is taken into consideration as precedent-worthy
TAKEN FROM Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancements of Executive Power"
19) How might the War Powers Resolution enhance the president's powers as Commander in Chief rather than limit them?
-the War Powers Resolution can be interpreted as giving the President a 'blank check' for hostilities for 60 days, essentially
-ONLY after 60 days can congress do anything at all about the conflict
-president's been given essentially unlimited authority for those first 2 months, however
-and EVEN THEN, congress has to declare hostilities opened in the area
-THEN the clock has to run out
-THEN congress has to pass a joint resolution requiring the president to bring the troops back
-THEN the court has to uphold it (most likely)
-so here, not only is an expansion of the president's commander in chief powers explicitly given, but it's given as a result of structural problems with the system itself as well
TAKEN FROM Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancements of Executive Power"
20) How has the development of a large standing army significantly weakened congressional checks on presidential war powers?
um. no idea.
