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Wednesday, March 28, 2007

Raamin Mostaghimi

3/28/07

AFP Section Writing

Kissinger’s "Vietnam: On the Road to Despair”

Kissinger’s analysis here has, contrary to your comments last section, captivated me once again. He looks at a completely different strategy that I found interesting- using Laos as a defense point for Southern Vietnam rather than South Vietnam itself. He makes the point that the Communists were treating the whole of Indochina as a single theater of war, while the Americans for some reason had separated them along the lines arbitrarily drawn to divide them into countries. Any strategic aim that Kennedy and Johnson were looking to accomplish would have been served equally well by fighting the North Vietnamese (and especially the Viet Cong) in Laos as in South Vietnam.

That the Kennedy administration was unwilling to sacrifice the ideological component of the war in this way for a purely strategic end really illustrates a point that Kissinger has been making throughout his analysis- that the United States has fought every war post-WWII with a handicap- ideology. The North Vietnamese could have been stopped and South Vietnam possibly secured without having to pit the US military against irregular guerilla forces with which it was not prepared to deal, but US prestige was at stake as soon as Johnson was sent over to the country. Had the US not fought with ideology and prestige on the line but rather as a soldier fights- like Eisenhower had suggested- it’s possible that the quagmire that Vietnam became could have been avoided entirely.

AP NOTES 3/27

Questions 1-4
-Post 1968 reforms of delegate selection
-Front-loading of primaries
-rules of the game and candidate strategy
-structure of contemporary parties

Questions 5-7
-partisan polarization
-partisan context and presidential leadership
-divided versus unified government

Questions 8-11
-production demands of the press
-press conferences versus public appearances
-media and presidential communication

Questions 12-15
-Role of OMB in regulatory review
-Presidential appointments
-presidential advantages vis-a-vis congress

Questions 16-18
-Presidential goals and judicial appointments
-partisan conflict over judicial appointments
-judicial enhancements of executive authority

Presidential War Powers
-Collective judgment in war making
-presidential advantages in foreign policy (two presidencies thesis)


Tuesday, March 27, 2007

AFP NOTES 3/27

Lecture 17: The Vietnam War, 1963-1969
US thought that the vietnam was was essentially a proxy war to start
-LIMITED war
US shall 'pay any cost, bear any burden' to ensure democracy around the world

A) Kennedy (1961-63)
Kennedy made the bear any burden speech
-key strategy was 'flexible response'
-this was in contrast to the strategy of massive retaliation
-two-pronged strategy for this
-founded the peace corps, to spread US values to the third world
-founded the green berets, trained to fight in the third world against communism
kennedy thought SE asia was key in the war against communism
-US stakes its prestige on the survival and success of S.Vietnam
big difference between kennedy and eisenhower
-eisenhower thought of vietnam as a military conflict
-kennedy put it into the context of the cold war, politicized it
-kennedy was really reluctant to commit ground forces, sent lots of advisors instead
US is willing to work with basically any sort of government as long as it wasnt communist
-military regimes and coups were supported
-'puppet regimes'
-south vietnamese people weren't willing to stand up for this government
Ngo Dinh Diem
puppet leader, assassinated
-ironically, JFK was assassinated just 3 weeks later
Ngo Dinh Nhu

B) Lyndon Johnson (1963-69)
comes to power after JFK is assassinated
-puts vietnam securely in the realm of US historical response
-'whenever the US had stood firm against aggression, it has been turned back'
-appeasement DOESNT WORK (look at hitler)
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
empowered the president to protect against ANY attack on US or SEATO forces
-SEATO- southeast asia treaty organization
-essentially a blank check for force
-SEATO is NEATO (props to evan)

Sec of Def McNamara
symmetric response was put into play here
-low grade nuclear weapons to be used to defoliate vietnam were considered, rejected as extreme
-meet aggression with matching defense
several things were considered when making airstrikes above the DMZ
-advantage gained by making the strikes
-risk incurred to planes and pilots
-danger of widening the conflict (china enters? oh shit)
-civilian casualties (baaaaaaad pr)
essentially the first time that the white house had micromanaged the war effort anywhere
airstrikes escalated during the war
-25,000 sorties flown in 1965, 108,000 in 67
-63,000 tons of bombs dropped in 65, 226,000 in 67
-scope of strikes escalated as well
-ended up encompassing even civilian infrastructure
-troop commitment shot up as well
-from 184,000 in 65 to 486,000 in 67
unfortunately, graduated response and 'calibration' DIDNT WORK in vietnam
-with the soviet union, perhaps it would have worked against nuclear holocaust
-EXCEPT the VC weren't the soviets
-only calibration and symmetrical response was interpreted as WEAKNESS rather than resolve
-gives the initiative to the VC
VC works out that the US really wants to negotiate
-drags out the conflict as long as possible
-keeps demanding more concessions
-johnson modifies negotiation policies
-starts suspending bombing during negotiation
-refuses to talk to the individual leaders of the national liberation front, waffles here, ends up accepting them as a legit political party
-longer the VC keep up the war, the better the terms are for them
US is locked into old-school strategy of search and destroy
-set piece battles just WERENT HAPPENING
-guerrilla war was just DIFFERENT
Sec of State Rusk
Nat Sec Advisor Rostow
Tet Offensive
VC offensive
-full-scale assault on the lunar new year
-attacked 30 vietnamese cities
-actually controlled one of them for 25 days
-most poignant image was that the US embassy at saigon was actually breeched for a time
-there was a huge loss of confidence and credibility for the johnson administration
irony here was that the Tet Offensive was basically a failure
-the south vietnamese weren't willing to rise up as the VC had expected
-the VietCong was basically wiped out
-N.Vietnamese regular army forces had to bear the brunt of the fighting
-N.Vietnamese are actually LOSING
-the american people didn't perceive it that way, though
-THATS why the US was losing
US general was asking for additional 200,000 troops, denied because the US just didn't have them
Johnson just doesn't run for reelection
the election was essentially a referendum on the war
-democratic nominees were bobby kennedy (assassinated), mcCarthy (lost), and johnson's VP (won the nomination)
-all lost to Richard Nixon. woot republican president
the chief purpose of the US in vietnam was CREDIBILITY
-US credibility as an ally on the international stage
-the problem was the strategy used by the superpowers
-korea, vietnam, afghanistan, etc were not contested because they were important, they were important because they were contested
-this is a problem
-there could not be any incursion in europe
-boundaries are far too clearly defined
-any incursion there would lead to nuclear conflict
-conflicts had to happen in the third world, where the borders were looser
-inspired the 'vietnam syndrome'
-any subsequent war was criticized as 'another vietnam'
-the real irony here was that the vietnam war actually shot our credibility to hell
-confirmed to other rebellions around the world that vietnam-esque tactics would work against the US
-another massive problem was that the s.vietnamese people would NOT stand up and fight for themselves
-korean people would, this is part of the reason why korea wasnt as big a failure
-all the american money POURING into vietnam destroyed the vietnamese economy

Monday, March 26, 2007

OCC CIV QUIZ QUESTIONS 3/26

1. What was the logic underlying the form of aid offered through the
Marshall Plan?

-the Marshall Plan, was the primary plan of the US to not only help rebuild the European Allies, but also help prevent another rise of Communism after WWII. The US, over a time span of four years, gave around 13 billion dollars to Europe in hopes of providing both economical and technical assistance. The plan offered the same form of assistance to the Soviet Union and its allies, but only if they agreed to certain terms and reforms set by the US. This plan was successful in rebuilding the destroyed economies of most of the European allies. The US’s logic behind this plan was to gain trust and alliance from European countries in hopes of a.) preventing communism and b.) gaining allies who would help them prevent communism should a country decide to revert back to it.


2. Describe the "path to Communism" of one Eastern or Central European
country. In what ways was this representative of the path taken by other
states in the postwar period?

-Poland devastated during WWII, Red Army occupied the country during WWII, crushed any resistance to Communism, US offered the Marshall Plan to Poland, but under pressure from Moscow, they declined and it becomes a satellite state for the Soviet Union, they decided not to claim reparations from other countries bc they were forced by the soviet Union, Soviet Union also helped rebuild Poland as part of the Warsaw Pact, due to heavy Soviet influence, Poland became Communist

-representative because communism shows up with heavy backing from the Soviet Union, it is the only way that it showed up in other countries because Bolshevism was contained within Russia after WWI, so communism could not spread naturally without force


3. Who were defined as Nazi collaborators after the war and how were they
treated?
what was a collaborator: p.44
and then that goes to about page 55 and 56
AFP NOTES 3/26

Lecture 16: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
point of the most confrontation between US and USSR
both are acting solely on their perceptions of the other country
-both are acting based on their own assumptions based on their own experiences
-Khruschev thought he was acting DEFENSIVELY
-Kennedy believed that khruschev was acting OFFENSIVELY
-violation of the monroe doctrine, america's defense perimeter
-Castro was acting in the framework of historical US-Cuban relations
BIGGEST PROBLEM in this situation:
-MIRROR IMAGING
-assuming that others see the world the way they do
-fail to anticipate actions, reactions, based on DIFFERING experiences
-acting on the assumption that reactions will be predictable, when they're NOT based on given information
CUBA is a dependency of US interests
-US owns 80% of the utilities, 90% of the mining, and 40% of the sugar industry in cuba
-it's as close to an entirely criminally organized state as it gets

A) Cuba: Khruschev vs. Kennedy (1961-63)

Batista -> Castro
Castro leads rebellion against corrupt batista
-began as small rebellion, grows rapidly
-not initially soviet or communist
US cuts off sugar imports from Cuba
-soviets move in and buy up all the excess
-eventually (october, 1959), soviets declare solidarity with cuba
Cuba becomes the first soviet satellite state outside the defensive perimeter
-first satellite state inside the US sphere of influence

Bay of Pigs
One of JFK's first acts was to authorize the bay of pigs invasion
-plan to land cuban exiles in the bay of pigs, spark revolution
-kennedy withheld US air support
-plan FAILED miserably, was a fiasco
other sorts of pressure, economic especially
-total US embargo to cuba
Operation Mongoose, Northwoods
CIA becomes one of the largest employers in miami, taking action against cuba
NORTHWOODS
-false flag incidents
-terrorist attacks or something like that
-would say that castro did it, spark US outrage against castro, use as pretext to go to war
-even would risk US civilian lives
OPLAN 312, OPLAN 314
full-scale invasion plans
-came back to haunt administration during the missile crisis
-when it came to the cuban missile crisis, there were no small, flexible plans to use
Operation Quick Kick
Lantphibex 1-62
-two US invasion plans
-Soviets estimated that cubans would last approx. 1 week against US assault
-they thought cuba would need some sort of deterrence as defense

other problems soviets had with US included BERLIN
-there was a huge brain drain from the soviets into west berlin
-hope was that by taking a similar action- popping a small redoubt inside the US defense perimeter, attention would be taken away from berlin, soviets could take it
another issue- TURKEY
-US had just placed MRBMs in turkey, on the border with soviets
-soviets hoped that US would remove these in exchange for them removing nukes in cuba
China
-hope was that this issue would cement Soviet supremacy over china (was this ever in question?)
Cold War politics
-soviets look tough, neutral states move towards their position
Domestic Politics
-lots of domestic programs were failing
-khruschev thought that with a major foreign policy success, attention would be diverted
B) Operation Anadyr
this was the OFFICIAL name of the nuclear deployment to cuba
-funny thing was, if soviets put a tiny armed detachment of soviet troops in cuba, same goals would have been achieved
-same deterrence
-instead, nukes were deployed
over 50,000 troops and personnel were to be deployed
-this had to be SECRET
-85 ships were used, some with round trips
-only had 4 months for this to take effect

Missile Gap
repairing the missile gap was one of the top issues for US policymakers
-US was actually far far ahead of the soviets
-khruschev's only hope for equalizing the missile gap in soviet favor was to deploy MRBMs and IRBMs within range of US, in cuba
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

plan was to deploy 36 R-12 MRBMs, 24 R-14 IRBMs
-this can attack any target on the mainland US
-to support them-
-4 Reinforced Motorized Rifle Regiments (14,000 men)
-42 IL-28 Bombers (6 were rigged to carry nuclear bombs)
-40 MIG fighters
-all sorts of cruise missiles and such
-6 Luna tactical nuclear missiles
-4 Foxtrot class submarines, each with a nuclear torpedo
-soviets were incorporating a tactical, short range nuclear deterrent
-MASSIVE nuclear presence, much more than US had expected
so there was central control of nuclear weapons, but with the massive distance between cuba and moscow, the control was effectively unenforceable
this was MUCH more provocative than the soviets thought
-kennedy said that if there was any indication of offensive Cuban capabilities, US would act

kennedy was notified about this on Oct 16, 1962
Issa Pliyev

EXCOM
executive committee of some sort
-immediately formed in response to the cuban missile crisis
-formed of the 'best and brightest'... fucking nerds
-entirely secret and covert
-deliberating american response
problems immediately
-are the missiles operational?
-right now, US knows that soviets are deploying missiles in cuba, but the soviets dont know they know
-immediate consensus was to set up an airstrike, take out the missiles
-air force told them that they couldn't guarantee destruction of all the missiles
-if any aren't hit, they get launched back at the US
-oh shit.
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff told them this ^^
kennedy closes off the airstrike option
-embargo/quarantine was put into effect
-US sets up a massive naval blockade around cuba
-nothing else was allowed in or out
-irony here was that the reason the US went to war in WWI and WWII was because of violation of freedom of the seas
-US was curtailing other nations' freedoms here, no basis in international law
-US was flexible in its interpretation of the blockade
-allowed ships that weren't carrying arms or equipment through
-Oct 24, blockade goes into effect
-Oct 26, first ship searched
-they made sure it was a ship that wouldn't have any contraband on it
-soviet ships had stopped right up against the US naval blockade
-one ship managed to slip through
-missiles hadn't gone through, but the warheads were in cuba
-the port they went to wasn't equipped to handle nuclear weapons, however, so the nukes were effectively neutralized
-US began to shadow soviet submarines
-practiced anti-submarine tactics
-launched practice depth charges at the soviet submarines
-US didn't realize that the submarines were equipped with nuclear torpedoes, whoops. dumbasses
-then EXCOM realized that the blockade had no effect on already existing nuke sites
-nobody knows what the soviet commander would have done if an invasion had occurred
-he was told NOT to use nukes, but what if he was cut off from moscow?
-first U2 was shot down
-done by accident, not under orders from soviet commanders
-both US and soviet forces are starting to act independently, leaders are losing control
-castro begs khruschev to hit the US with whatever they have
US agreed to pull their missiles in turkey out 4-5 months after the cuban missiles were pulled out
-soviets took the deal
what were long term problems?
-marginalization
-of congress- congress was cut completely out of the loop
-of allies- castro's demands were essentially ignored
-guesswork was exposed
-HUGE errors in CIA analysis of soviet actions
-HUGE HUMAN ERRORS
-norad actually believed that it was under attack by soviet missiles from cuba due to accidental test tape insertion
-hoooooly shit.

DEFCON

Adlai Stevenson

Jupiter Missiles

whos a badass? raamin's a badass