Raamin Mostaghimi
3/21/07
AFP Section Writing

Henry Kissinger's "The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War"

Kissinger's analysis in "The Dilemma of Containment" was nothing short of incredible for me. The idea that mistakes so totally dominated the battlefield and the ensuing negotiations boggles the mind, really, especially when you consider that some of the greatest minds in the world were running the country at the time.
Douglas MacArthur's blunder before the war even started of not mentioning Korea as inside the American defense perimeter was what led the North Koreans to believe that they could take over the peninsula in the first place. After American forces were committed to Korea and MacArthur pushed the North Koreans back past the choke point of the peninsula, he made the second blunder of not stopping there and threatening the Chinese. If the administration had just made public the order to MacArthur not to go within 100 miles of the Chinese border, it's possible the Chinese would have been placated. Then, the Chinese made a mistake of their own- attempting to push the Americans entirely off the peninsula, rather than stopping after reaching the 38th parallel. If they had done that, they would have won a resounding victory in the eyes of the world, but their mistake here led to even more problems for them later on, when American forces made a huge comeback and re-established the 38th parallel themselves.
So mistake after mistake after mistake was what characterized the Korean War, and I don't know quite how I feel about that. International victories should go to the party that does the most right, not does the least wrong, but hey, I guess that's how it works when enough players enter the equation. If the US thought they were fighting a war JUST with Korea, there's no doubt that the North Koreans would have been crushed mercilessly. However, when the Chinese and the Soviets were taken into consideration, the complexity of the situation was just too great for flawless execution.

AFP NOTES 3/20

Lecture 15: Eisenhower, Brinksmanship, and Rollback, 1953-1961

Eisenhower (1953-61)
in office during the real crux of the cold war
basic agenda was to differentiate himself from truman
-extremely popular when he entered office

SoS John Foster Dulles (1953-58)
Right-hand-man of eisenhower
DEDICATED cold warrior
-even refused to shake the hand of the chinese foreign minister
attacks the truman administration
-especially attacks CONTAINMENT
-abandons millions to live under the terrible rule of communism
-new plan- ROLLBACK
The New Look
eisenhower administration's new approach to foreign policy
these were the precepts
Massive Retaliation
Liberation
Asymmetric Response
International system is ruled by LAW, soviets and communism operate OUTSIDE the law
-Eisenhower is more realist
-american need to ensure at MINIMUM free trade
-communism harms free trade, must be destroyed
the asymmetric response meant to meet force with OVERWHELMING force
-reply to aggression in ways calculated to play to american strengths, not on the enemy terms

Eisenhower pointed out the limits of massive retaliation
-one problem was SUBVERSION
-there's no countering military force there
-long term 'liberation can only come by peaceful means'
Deterrence was KEY for Dulles' strategy
-communists have to believe that the US will be willing to use every available option to counter, including nuclear
A) Excessive Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence
one main critique of Eisenhower administration
3 reasons that eisenhower favored nuclear deterrence
-economic
-tactical
-strategic
eisenhower was a huge fiscal conservative
-was afraid that if budget wasnt balanced and military-industrial complex wasnt kept in control, US would become a GARRISON STATE
-was afraid that deficit spending and massive military spending was taking money away from social spending
-key point here was to reject NSC 68- the US can spend up to 20% more of GDP on arms
-military spending actually DECREASED during his time in office (69.5% to 50.8% in 7 years)
was only willing to commit ground forces to 'brushfire wars'
-small wars, nothing like korea
-participation in small wars is 'primarily a job for the navy and air force'
-anything bigger than a small conflict is a job for nuclear weapons
-army actually shrank from 1.5 to 1 million men
-continued to warn against the 'military-industrial complex'

NSC 162/2
'in the event of hostility on the parts of the ussr and china, the US will consider nuclear weapons as a legitimate tactical response'
-there's no difference between nukes and just really big bombs
-atomic weapons become akin to conventional weapons
-they've achieved 'conventional status'
-eisenhower is willing to use them even in limited wars
the reason for this was to counter soviet aggression in europe
-the only real way to counter the massive red army in europe was to use battlefield tactical nuclear weapons
May 9, 1955, Germany joins NATO
-now american defense perimeter is right up against soviet perimeter
May 14, 1955, Warsaw pact is signed
War games were conducted by NATO, it was determined that 171 nukes would have to be launched at the soviets to finish the war
Brinksmanship
'the ability to go to the verge without moving into war'
-the system only works if BOTH SIDES are willing to move up to the very edge
-deterrence is ensured in this way
-eisenhower is big on this
-ended korean war in this way, at least partially
-threatened to use nukes, we win gg noobs
April 3, 1954
-Dulles meets with congress, asks for permission to enter the war in vietnam
-makes the 'domino theory' speech
-eisenhower was prepared to intervene on two conditions
-french promised full independence after communism was beat back
-uk entered as well
-US is essentially the only reason the french are still in indochina
-US is paying 75% of the costs of the french war in indochina
-french are losing pretty bad, pinned down at Dien Bien Phu
-eisenhower was considering dropping 3 tactical nukes around the fortress to kill the communist forces, rejects the idea
-eisenhower was aware that if ANY American forces were committed to indochina, then they would HAVE TO WIN
-american prestige is at stake at that point
-then, french collapse at Dien Bien Phu, they lose the war
-indochina's split into cambodia, laos, and vietnam
-north and south vietnam split apart
-north becomes communist, south is not
-US immediately begins funneling money and military advisors into south vietnam
-idea was to set up a proxy state in s.vietnam
-hopefully they'd make another south korea

Quemoy and Matsu
real issue is still china
-nationalists are still holed up in taiwan
-at these two islands, the nationalists decided to make a stand
-daring the commies to take the islands back
-jan 24, 1955 eisenhower asks congress for permission to deploy forces to defend taiwan and taiwanese interests
-was afraid that if he went through the whole congressional process in the event of chinese aggression, it'd be too late
-congress agrees, gives the presidency a blank check for the first time
-this is just a nod to the fact that diplomacy and military strategy unfolds too fast for congress
-this was the CLOSEST the US came to launch a preemptive war
-problem here was that the only real method of defending the islands was to use nuclear weapons
administration has done everything possible to strip away the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons
-there are issues with this, however
-applicability
-who's gonna be happy with the US if they go around killing mass numbers of people?
-feasibility (NUTS- nuclear utilization and target selection)
-is it actually possible to fight a nuclear war without it becoming a full scale war?
B) Third World Revolution
eisenhower essentially fumbles the new third world revolutions
-another big critique of the eisenhower administration
throughout the third world, states were demanding independence from colonial powers
-european colonial powers start withdrawing from the third world
administration response:
-psychological operations
-trying to bring them onto the US side
-bribery
-US steps up 'foreign aid' to all these new nations
-covert operations
-brand new arena in US international action
-the new CIA comes to the forefront

problem here was that eisenhower never really articulated or decided any policy with regards to these new states
-would the US ally itself with ANY state willing to ally with US goals, regardless of form of government?
-would the US only push away communist regimes?

Allen Dulles
CIA expands HUGELY
-brother of John Foster Dulles
-gets a new mission statement under eisenhower
new, more aggressive strategy
Coups are now supported
-failed coups include Indonesia in 1958, and cuba in 1960, again in 61
Guerilla action sponsored
-vs china, N. vietnam
Assassination attempts
-huge list of people
-'bureau of health alteration'
-thats just the funniest thing in the fucking world
-attempts:
-zhou enlai of china
-Patrice Lumumba of the congo (shittiest place ever. fuck the belgians, apparently)
-rafael trujillo
-fidel castro (failed a bunch of times)
International spy network was ramped up
domestic infiltration
-any domestic organization that might be a threat
-under the charter, it's technically not allowed to operate on US soil

Operation Ajax, Iran - Mossadegh
Huge success for the CIA
spheres of influence were established
-russians and british
-british basically were there for oil
Mossadegh took power 1951
-agenda was nationalization
-wanted to take over the british oilfields
-british appealed the the US for aid
CIA begins a huge disinformation campaign
-paints mossadegh as an agent for communist expansion
-not true, was an iranian nationalist
-iranians HATE russia. idiots
-US policy was shifted on the basis of suspected communist ties on the part of Mossadegh
-restored power to the Shah
Operation Success, Guatemala - Arbenz
another huge success for the CIA
1951- Arbenz took office
-most of guatemala was controlled by foreign corporations
-big one was 'united fruit co'
-guatemala begins nationalizing land throughout guatemala, redistributing it to peasants
-trying to become self-sufficient
CIA goes in
-media campaign, painting Arbenz as a communist
-CIA takes a former coup leader and introduces him to the area
-brought all sorts of rebels and military elements to surrounding countries
-cut off guatemala from US aid
-actually invaded by proxy troops

C) Missile Gap
Americans were concerned that the US was losing relative advantage to the soviets

1957
-august- first ICBM
-oct- sputnik
american concept of isolation from outside enemies is shot
ICBM/SLBM/IRBM
now russia can strike the US from within its own territory
Sputnik
first satellite, launched the space race
Gaither Report
november 1957
-recommendations for US security
-develop ICBMs, SLBMs
-IRBMs in Europe
-disperse bases, early warning, harden bases
-create fallout shelters
-every family's entitled to a fallout shelter

eisenhower refused to endorse the entire package
-this would involve a MASSIVE amount of spending
-was satisfied with 'sufficiency'
-americans have just enough nukes to ensure deterrence
-ended up in the right
-massive soviet ramp up of nuclear production was essentially a bluff, they didnt have the resources to do so
D) Failed Negotiations
russia/china relations are actually not so monolithic as eisenhower thought
U2
soviets were bluffing, eisenhower was trying to ensure this
-launched U2 after U2 after U2 to spy on the soviets
-launched one too many, one got shot down, destroyed any negotiations taking place

Fascism questions:

Why were the Germans so eager to go to war in 1914?

-because of the naval arms race between Britain and Germany

-war plans of Germany, France, and Russia automatically escalated conflict (Schlieffen plan)

-Germany before the war ran on military timetables, when things went wrong

-rising militarism, provoked an attitude that desired war

-unification of Germany had occurred around 40 years before, they wanted to fight as a nation

-wanted to be an imperial power, wanted to try and take British colonies

-they had many alliances with countries, wanted to back their allies because they believed the same would be done for them

Was the war an aberration or the culmination of a long process in European history?

-culmination because of the large number of alliances that were made before WWI, they had an obligation to go to war if one country declared it, became an entire web of alliances that set the whole world into battle

-imperialism, all European countries were competing for limited colonies, tensions running high

What did WWI have to do with Fascism?

-by the end of WWI, Germany had lost everything and had to pay lots of reparations due to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I

-these conditions that the rest of Europe left Germany in set the stage for them to be heavily opposed to other countries and ethnicities because they saw them as impure and corrupt

-also set the exact conditions required for Paxton’s definition of Fascism to be fulfilled (sense of overwhelming crisis, belief one’s group is the victim, right of the “chose people” to domination without moral or legal restraint)

How does Paxton explain the origins of Fascist movements?

i hate you all. bitches

(we didn’t know the answer to this one because we couldn’t read and couldn’t find a single person who did, we apologize…if you read, then you are a nerd)

AFP NOTES 3/19

Lecture 14: Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1953, Part 2
sorry for the lack of organization, there was only a tiny outline given.

June 1950- N.Korea invades S.Korea
-up until that point, containment was the name of the game
-US has 'drawn a line in the sand'
-communists violate it, korea is the first test of containment

Up until this point, 'perfect communication' is assumed
-this is simply not true
-problems in communications and intentions, etc, complicate the situation
-mistakes begin to dominate the international playing field

Really, only a few possibilities of soviet attack were considered
-surprise attack against US territory
-pearl harbor was the model for this
-soviet invasion of western europe
-this was the area of the 'iron curtain'
-place where the us/soviet divide was most obvious
-the 'peripheral' strategy was never even considered

Korea was occupied by japan during WWII, then occupied by joint us-soviet command
-spheres of influence established, north are communist, south is democratic
-Soviets take at face value US pronouncement that korea is outside the US protection sphere
-US had allowed china to fall, that was a much bigger loss
-nobody thought they'd fight over tiny little korea
-MacArthur actually went through and named the islands under the protection of the US sphere of defense
-neither korea nor taiwan were mentioned
-american policymakers were still hoping that the nationalist forces would reconquest mainland china
-throughout 1949, US withdraws from south korea
-US essentially deliberately starves S.Korean forces to make sure they couldn't invade the north on their own
-Jan 1950- US SoS Dean Acheson specifically states that the US will NOT intervene in mainland asia
-Europe is the focus of any possible war
-the lesson drawn from WWII, however, was that unless aggressors are stopped early, they'll steamroll ahead until it becomes very difficult to stop them


A) Containment Tested: Korea

38th Parallel
June 25, 1950- S. Korea invaded by N. Korea
-2 days later, MacArthur commits massive naval and air forces to S.Korean defense
-June 30, MacArthur gets approval for ground forces as well
-also, unprecedented (and singular, during the cold war) action- UN sends peacekeeping forces through the security council
-UN member states contribute forces, it's not ONLY the US forces doing the fighting
-UN resolution gives truman moral leverage, he uses it a whole bunch
-US policymakers have NO plan for this sort of event
-peripheral, limited war was never considered
-US is playing this one by ear
-truman makes a few decisions to contain the war to Korea
-sends the 7th fleet to ensure Taiwanese defense
-first explicit US commitment to protect taiwan
-increased support to french forces in indochina

Pyongyang
MacArthur sees this as opportunity not just to contain N.Korean aggression, but to start a policy of 'rollback'
-could actually reunite korea up to chinese border
-truman picked up on this, announced that koreans had a right to be 'free, independent, and UNITED'
-says pyongyang will be the 'first' iron curtain capital to be liberated (implication is that it wont be the last)
-to do this, MacArthur makes an amphibious landing behind N.Korean forces, fuckslams their troops to all hell
-MacArthur gets authorization to go beyond the 38th parallel
-oct 7, US troops cross the parallel
-US introduces a resolution into the UN supporting this event, passes by vote of 47-5
this is known as 'mission creep'
-where your mission gradually moves forward and gets bigger
-truman makes 'reunification' the explicit goal of US policy in korea
MacArthur was ordered NOT to approach the chinese border (yalu river)
-unfortunately, the order was never made public, and macarthur ignored it anyways
if US policymakers had studied history, they'd have known what the chinese response would have been
-twice before, korea had been used as a springboard to invade mainland china
-end of the 16th and end of the 19th century
-chinese realized that the only way to make sure their borders were secure was to keep korea secure
-November 26th, chinese launch a MASSIVE invasion along the yalu river
-seoul is reoccupied by communist forces
Seoul
if the chinese had decided to just stop there, return to prewar borders, they would have won a huge moral victory
-mao decided to go forward, overplayed his hand just like the US did before

Douglas MacArthur
truman's guiding motive was to prevent a third world war
-macarthur did not accept this reasoning
-he believed the americans couldn't limit themselves and still win the war
-US was still massively eurocentric
-US sends troops into western europe even during the war
-asia is a 'holding operation'
-it's at this point that the US allows for germany to rearm
-does so to reinforce their capacities in europe
-macarthur calls administration 'europhiles'
-'it is ASIA that is the real test of containment'
-if asia falls, europe stands no chance
-his plan was to step up the bombing campaign to include mainland china (particularly airbases and industry)
-impose a naval blockade on china
-intensify US operations in Korea (the troops being sent to europe should have been sent to Korea)
-introduce nationalist chinese forces to the korean front
-this was the last straw
-April 11, 1951- truman fires macarthur
-scared that macarthur's comments would bring soviets into the war
-truman says that he didnt fire macarthur because he was a bastard, he fired him because he wasnt following orders
here's the problem now
-US can't win
-if they did, they risk brining soviets into the war
-US can't lose
-US has put far too much moral capital into the war to lose
-only solution is to reestablish stalemate
-the establishment of stalemate took sooooo long
-more american casualties during the negotiation time than during the rest of the war
This was first war fought by the US with limitations
-Offensive limitations
-limited war, no nukes
-Defensive limitations
-same kind of thing

post korean war, massive increase in defense expenditures
-up 257%
-leads to the security dilemma

the issue was that the US was a status quo power after the end of wwii, while soviets were a revisionist power
-soviets only gain from upending the international system
-this fact means there is no possibility of reconciliation between the two