Raamin Mostaghimi
3/21/07
AFP Section Writing
3/21/07
AFP Section Writing
Henry Kissinger's "The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War"
Kissinger's analysis in "The Dilemma of Containment" was nothing short of incredible for me. The idea that mistakes so totally dominated the battlefield and the ensuing negotiations boggles the mind, really, especially when you consider that some of the greatest minds in the world were running the country at the time.
Douglas MacArthur's blunder before the war even started of not mentioning Korea as inside the American defense perimeter was what led the North Koreans to believe that they could take over the peninsula in the first place. After American forces were committed to Korea and MacArthur pushed the North Koreans back past the choke point of the peninsula, he made the second blunder of not stopping there and threatening the Chinese. If the administration had just made public the order to MacArthur not to go within 100 miles of the Chinese border, it's possible the Chinese would have been placated. Then, the Chinese made a mistake of their own- attempting to push the Americans entirely off the peninsula, rather than stopping after reaching the 38th parallel. If they had done that, they would have won a resounding victory in the eyes of the world, but their mistake here led to even more problems for them later on, when American forces made a huge comeback and re-established the 38th parallel themselves.
So mistake after mistake after mistake was what characterized the Korean War, and I don't know quite how I feel about that. International victories should go to the party that does the most right, not does the least wrong, but hey, I guess that's how it works when enough players enter the equation. If the US thought they were fighting a war JUST with Korea, there's no doubt that the North Koreans would have been crushed mercilessly. However, when the Chinese and the Soviets were taken into consideration, the complexity of the situation was just too great for flawless execution.
Kissinger's analysis in "The Dilemma of Containment" was nothing short of incredible for me. The idea that mistakes so totally dominated the battlefield and the ensuing negotiations boggles the mind, really, especially when you consider that some of the greatest minds in the world were running the country at the time.
Douglas MacArthur's blunder before the war even started of not mentioning Korea as inside the American defense perimeter was what led the North Koreans to believe that they could take over the peninsula in the first place. After American forces were committed to Korea and MacArthur pushed the North Koreans back past the choke point of the peninsula, he made the second blunder of not stopping there and threatening the Chinese. If the administration had just made public the order to MacArthur not to go within 100 miles of the Chinese border, it's possible the Chinese would have been placated. Then, the Chinese made a mistake of their own- attempting to push the Americans entirely off the peninsula, rather than stopping after reaching the 38th parallel. If they had done that, they would have won a resounding victory in the eyes of the world, but their mistake here led to even more problems for them later on, when American forces made a huge comeback and re-established the 38th parallel themselves.
So mistake after mistake after mistake was what characterized the Korean War, and I don't know quite how I feel about that. International victories should go to the party that does the most right, not does the least wrong, but hey, I guess that's how it works when enough players enter the equation. If the US thought they were fighting a war JUST with Korea, there's no doubt that the North Koreans would have been crushed mercilessly. However, when the Chinese and the Soviets were taken into consideration, the complexity of the situation was just too great for flawless execution.
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