Part 1: Short Answer ID Questions
Long Telegram
George Kennan
LONG TELEGRAM, FEB 1946
argued that the sources of soviet foreign policy lay deep within the system itself
-at the bottom of the reasoning laid a deep sense of insecurity
-both external and internal
-insecure in relation to foreign powers, what they might do to it
-also insecure in relation to its own people, not sure if they ACTUALLY own the soviet people
-post-war soviet foreign policy would be a mix of Tzarist expansionism and the soviet sense of mission
-Tzarist expansionism- own Poland, establish a 'warm water port'
-soviet sense of mission- "fig leaf"- they said they acted on the same principles as America- peace for all, etc- but this was actually a front for establishing totalitarianism
Kennan thought a confrontation between US and USSR was inevitable
-Kennan was a realist
-2 views- Universalistic (liberal) or Particularized (realist)
-thought that US should go with the particularized view, because otherwise the US would be forced to maintain their universalistic rule of law around the world, can't afford to do that
Thought that the US should draw a line
-what are the areas we CANNOT allow to fall under soviet control?
-for kennan
-atlantic community
-med. community through Iran
-japan & philippines
-found 5 essential power structures in the world
-US, UK, Germany, Japan, USSR
-US has control of the spectrum to start, can't allow the three in the middle to turn to soviet aims
Was NOT afraid of soviet invasion
-was afraid of soviet communism subverting those nations, cause germany and japan are already demoralized
3 plans by Kennan to win the cold war
-Self-Confidence
-Exploiting internal tension
-USSR's children will destroy it
-in the future, nationalistic strains of communism will compete with the soviet strain, cause more tensions
-modification of soviet mindset
3 criteria for whether we should intervene
-is assistance justified?
-not just anyone non-communists
-not backing non-communist dictatorships
-is american security at stake?
-cost vs benefits
-is it in america's interests to do so? would it be too expensive to?
-if a state on its own initiative votes in a free election for a communist govt, the US should NOT intervene
battle of 'hearts and minds'
-he'd prefer if the defeat of the USSR came slowly by diplomatic means, rather than it coming quickly by military means
-he was actually correct, war with the USSR was NOT necessary, it fell from within
Truman Doctrine
'support free peoples against armed minorities or outside pressures'
-asks for aid to help turkey and greece
-america in order to prevent internal subversion of states, needs to address the issues of poverty, misery, and want
-the secret to success from then on during the cold war was to convince the US that the opponent was either communist or allied with moscow
-this brought US into war on their side
-US commits $400 million to greece and turkey
-FIRST TIME US has gone outside self-imposed restriction of the monroe doctrine during peacetime
Encompassed within it the MARSHALL PLAN, DOMINO THEORY
announces marshall plan on June 5, 1947
-trick in maintaining democracy against communist subversion was to reestablish a strong economy in affected countries
Domino Theory
The idea was that if one country fell to communism in a region, then the whole region would be destabilized
-applied in Greece to great effect
-Korea to lesser effect
-Vietnam to pretty much failure
-Afghanistan was good, though
-one of main justifications for the marshall plan
-western europe needed to be IMPENETRABLE to soviet advance
NSC-68
document released about how to proceed in asia
-firmly rejects isolationism
-explicit declaration of the US recognizing soviet objectives, rejecting them
-US will protect and defend the 'free world'
-'free world' is ANYONE not communist
-endorsed containment by all means short of war
-tried to foster seeds of destruction within the soviet system
-if the soviets will try to undermine our values, we'll do the same to them
-problem is that US is in a state of 'relative decline'
-US is more powerful than ever, but USSR is gaining strength faster than they are, so they're in 'relative decline'
-US HAS to win the cold war, regardless of any domestic taxes, spending, etc
-'a defeat anywhere in the free world is a defeat everywhere'
Douglas MacArthur
Commander of US forces in Korea during the Korean War
strong personality, disagreed with truman often
truman's guiding motive was to prevent a third world war
-macarthur did not accept this reasoning
-he believed the americans couldn't limit themselves and still win the war
-US was still massively eurocentric
-US sends troops into western europe even during the war
-asia is a 'holding operation'
-it's at this point that the US allows for germany to rearm
-does so to reinforce their capacities in europe
-macarthur calls administration 'europhiles'
-'it is ASIA that is the real test of containment'
-if asia falls, europe stands no chance
-his plan was to step up the bombing campaign to include mainland china (particularly airbases and industry)
-impose a naval blockade on china
-intensify US operations in Korea (the troops being sent to europe should have been sent to Korea)
-introduce nationalist chinese forces to the korean front
-this was the last straw
-April 11, 1951- truman fires macarthur
-scared that macarthur's comments would bring soviets into the war
-truman says that he didnt fire macarthur because he was a bastard, he fired him because he wasnt following orders
Dean Acheson
Secretary of state in 1950
-definitively declares what the US sphere of interest was in asia
-states that the US will NOT engage in hostilities in mainland asia
-contributes to the whole misinformation causes problems thing
-because of this, N. Korea thinks that they can invade S. Korea without US intervention
-they are WRONG
-leads to korean war. haha. noobs.
Containment
theory proposed in the "X Article" in 1947
-US policy should be one of FIRM CONTAINMENT (this is important) at every point with counter-force
-allow soviet domination within its sphere of influence
-HOWEVER, be prepared for all-out war if the soviets break out of their defined sphere
-this is the guiding light of US-Soviet relations for much of the cold war
-Strongpoint defense is the name of the game here
-defend certain key 'strongpoints' that can be held against soviet assault
-use them as strategic outposts
-make sure they're located on key geopolitical points
-US needs to distinguish 2 sets of interests- vital and peripheral
-vital
-Europe, Middle East, Japan
-peripheral
-Mainland Asia
-determinants of vital interests
-strategic location (chokepoints, trade or communication)
-military/industrial capacity (if it has high military/industrial capacity, it can contribute to the war effort)
-raw materials (OIL most importantly)
-lines of communication (don't let france become communist, cause that would cut off west germany, for example)
-use an asymmetric response to respond to threats in these area (any means necessary, overwhelming force, anything that works, etc)
-difference between US and Soviet policy was that USSR looks for control, US looks for denial of Soviet control, just influence
Rollback
Theory formulated in opposition to Containment
-MacArthur was a big proponent of this
-the US needs to start actively attacking soviet and soviet-affiliated interests
-for example, US goal in Korea was just to bring the stalemate point back to the pre-war border
-macarthur advocated total korean reunification, taking the border back up to the Yalu river
-this really came to prominence under Eisenhower
Eisenhower attacks the truman administration
-especially attacks CONTAINMENT
-abandons millions to live under the terrible rule of communism
-new plan- ROLLBACK
Three precepts:
Massive Retaliation
Liberation
Asymmetric Response
Asymmetric Response
One of the precepts of Eisenhower's "New Look" at foreign policy
Old (Liberal) idea was that International system is ruled by LAW, soviets and communism operate OUTSIDE the law
-Eisenhower is more realist
-american need to ensure at MINIMUM free trade
-communism harms free trade, must be destroyed
the asymmetric response meant to meet force with OVERWHELMING force
-reply to aggression in ways calculated to play to american strengths, not on the enemy terms
Eisenhower pointed out the limits of massive retaliation
-one problem was SUBVERSION
-there's no countering military force there
-long term 'liberation can only come by peaceful means'
Deterrence was KEY for Dulles' strategy
-communists have to believe that the US will be willing to use every available option to counter, including nuclear
Brinksmanship
'the ability to go to the verge without moving into war'
-the system only works if BOTH SIDES are willing to move up to the very edge
-deterrence is ensured in this way
-eisenhower is big on this
-ended korean war in this way, at least partially
-threatened to use nukes, we win gg noobs
Massive Retaliation
Part of Asymmetric Response
-whoop the shit out of any challengers with overwhelming force
-will eventually become part of the Powell Doctrine
Dien Bien Phu
final redoubt for french forces in indochina
-they begged the US to intervene
-french are losing pretty bad, pinned down at Dien Bien Phu
-eisenhower was considering dropping 3 tactical nukes around the fortress to kill the communist forces, rejects the idea
-eisenhower was aware that if ANY American forces were committed to indochina, then they would HAVE TO WIN
-american prestige is at stake at that point
-then, french collapse at Dien Bien Phu, they lose the war
-indochina's split into cambodia, laos, and vietnam
-north and south vietnam split apart
-north becomes communist, south is not
-US immediately begins funneling money and military advisors into south vietnam
-idea was to set up a proxy state in s.vietnam
-hopefully they'd make another south korea
Quemoy and Matsu
Two islands off the coast of china
real issue is still china
-nationalists are still holed up in taiwan
-at these two islands, the nationalists decided to make a stand
-daring the commies to take the islands back
-jan 24, 1955 eisenhower asks congress for permission to deploy forces to defend taiwan and taiwanese interests
-was afraid that if he went through the whole congressional process in the event of chinese aggression, it'd be too late
-congress agrees, gives the presidency a blank check for the first time
-this is just a nod to the fact that diplomacy and military strategy unfolds too fast for congress
-this was the CLOSEST the US came to launch a preemptive war
-problem here was that the only real method of defending the islands was to use nuclear weapons
administration has done everything possible to strip away the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons
-there are issues with this, however
-applicability
-who's gonna be happy with the US if they go around killing mass numbers of people?
-feasibility (NUTS- nuclear utilization and target selection)
-is it actually possible to fight a nuclear war without it becoming a full scale war?
Operation Ajax
Operation took place in Iran
Huge success for the CIA
spheres of influence were established in middle east
-russians and british
-british basically were there for oil
Mossadegh took power in Iran 1951
-agenda was nationalization
-wanted to take over the british oilfields
-british appealed the the US for aid
CIA begins a huge disinformation campaign
-paints mossadegh as an agent for communist expansion
-not true, was an iranian nationalist
-iranians HATE russia. idiots
-US policy was shifted on the basis of suspected communist ties on the part of Mossadegh
-restored power to the Shah
Operation Success
CIA Operation in Guatemala
another huge success for the CIA
1951- Arbenz took office
-most of guatemala was controlled by foreign corporations
-big one was 'united fruit co'
-guatemala begins nationalizing land throughout guatemala, redistributing it to peasants
-trying to become self-sufficient
CIA goes in
-media campaign, painting Arbenz as a communist
-CIA takes a former coup leader and introduces him to the area
-brought all sorts of rebels and military elements to surrounding countries
-cut off guatemala from US aid
-actually invaded by proxy troops
Missile Gap
Americans were concerned that the US was losing relative advantage to the soviets
1957
-august- first ICBM
-oct- sputnik
american concept of isolation from outside enemies is shot
Gaither Report
november 1957
-recommendations for US security
-develop ICBMs, SLBMs
-IRBMs in Europe
-disperse bases, early warning, harden bases
-create fallout shelters
-every family's entitled to a fallout shelter
eisenhower refused to endorse the entire package
-this would involve a MASSIVE amount of spending
-was satisfied with 'sufficiency'
-americans have just enough nukes to ensure deterrence
-ended up in the right
-massive soviet ramp up of nuclear production was essentially a bluff, they didnt have the resources to do so
repairing the missile gap was one of the top issues for US policymakers
-US was actually far far ahead of the soviets
-khruschev's only hope for equalizing the missile gap in soviet favor was to deploy MRBMs and IRBMs within range of US, in cuba
Bay of Pigs
One of JFK's first acts was to authorize the bay of pigs invasion
-plan to land cuban exiles in the bay of pigs, spark revolution
-kennedy withheld US air support
-plan FAILED miserably, was a fiasco
other sorts of pressure were undertaken, economic especially
-total US embargo to cuba
Operation Anadyr
this was the OFFICIAL name of the Soviet nuclear deployment to cuba
-funny thing was, if soviets put a tiny armed detachment of soviet troops in cuba, same goals would have been achieved
-same deterrence
-instead, nukes were deployed
over 50,000 troops and personnel were to be deployed
-this had to be SECRET
-85 ships were used, some with round trips
-only had 4 months for this to take effect
Adlai Stevenson
US Ambassador to the UN under Kennedy
(Taken from Wikipedia)
His most famous moment came on October 25, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, when he gave a presentation at an emergency session of the Security Council. He forcefully asked the Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin, if his country was installing missiles in Cuba, punctuated with the famous demand "Don't wait for the translation, answer 'yes' or 'no'!" in demanding an immediate answer. Following Zorin's refusal to answer the abrupt question, Stevenson retorted, "I am prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over." In a diplomatic coup, Stevenson then showed photographs that proved the existence of missiles in Cuba, just after the Soviet ambassador had said they did not exist.
Ho Chi Minh Trail
Logistical system used by the North Vietnamese during the War
-the big thing was that it ran through Laos and Cambodia, so the US was reluctant to make strikes on it
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Passed by congress in response to relatively minor attacks by Vietnamese forces on US naval assets in the Tonkin Gulc
empowered the president to protect against ANY attack on US or SEATO forces
-SEATO- southeast asia treaty organization
-essentially a blank check for force
-SEATO is NEATO (props to evan)
Tet Offensive
VC offensive
-full-scale assault on the lunar new year
-attacked 30 vietnamese cities
-actually controlled one of them for 25 days
-most poignant image was that the US embassy at saigon was actually breeched for a time
-there was a huge loss of confidence and credibility for the johnson administration
irony here was that the Tet Offensive was basically a failure
-the south vietnamese weren't willing to rise up as the VC had expected
-the VietCong was basically wiped out
-N.Vietnamese regular army forces had to bear the brunt of the fighting
-N.Vietnamese are actually LOSING
-the american people didn't perceive it that way, though
-THATS why the US was losing
Vietnamization
Part of Nixon's "peace with honor" program
-the idea was to buy time for the s. vietnamese
-US would stave off the VC attacks while they armed and equipped indigenous S. vietnamese forces to do their own fighting
-became a cornerstone of the 'nixon doctrine'
Vietnam Syndrome
The idea that the US people would be extremely against entering other wars because of the chaos and failure associated with the Vietnam War
-kind of was true
-US didn't engage in any other full-scale wars during the Cold War
-was said to be finished with the 1st gulf war
-'the ghosts of vietnam have been put to rest beneath the sands of the arabian desert'
-not really
-mogadishu's the best example
-clinton RAN from that place after US soldiers were killed
-extremely reluctant to commit troops in Rwanda or Bosnia, too
Nixon Doctrine
Vietnamization expressed on a large scale
Unless on state came into threat from nukes, US is is going to expect the problem will be handled by Asian nations themselves. Allys take burden of own defense, and has a right to expect this (what? baia...)
- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.
Shanghai Communique
Communique issued by Nixon, stating that it was in both of their interests to normalize relations
-US affirmed their own version of the one china policy
-pledged to reduce arms installations in taiwan
-also agreed that NO POWER should establish hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region
-this part warned the USSR against an invasion of china
-it basically moved china from an enemy in isolation to a de facto ally in less than 4 years
-flanked the USSR with NATO and China
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Signed by Nixon in 1972, between US and USSR
-limited/prohibited the development of anti-ballistic missiles
-these would form a sort of 'missile shield' around the US
-problem was that they were imperfect, also prone to being overwhelmed
-ABMs could actually PRECIPITATE war, rather than prevent it
-ABMs were replaced by MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction)
Brezhnev Doctrine
-if any country had gone socialist or entered the soviet bloc, soviets claim the right to intervene to put down counter-insurgencies
oooooo dang
-basically countered US influence around the world
-kind of a monroe doctrine for politically aligned nations, rather than geographically aligned nations
Carter Doctrine
a 'new, fresh approach to foreign policy'
Human Rights
-made 'decency and optimism' guiding lights of foreign policy
-human rights come to the forefront here
-hoped to promote human rights in the soviet union while maintaining detente
-essentially does exactly the wrong thing
-SENDS MIXED SIGNALS
-geopolitical arena turns right against us, lowest point of american prestige was in 1979
-there was the second oil shock in the decade during the iranian revolution
-sets off a spiral of stagflation
-this was the 'malaise' period of american history
NSDD 75
there are some problems now
-seems like containment had failed
-soviet union is expanding throughout the 3rd world
-there's little possibility for expansion of confrontation to the nuclear level, because they're proxy wars
-reagan doctrine therefore says essentially, we'll help you, under three conditions
these conditions are:
1) indigenous democratic resistance
2) against a 'soviet client state'
3) with a population denied representation within its own government (illegitimate government)
under those criteria, reagan doctrine will be applied
now, the reagan doctrine's being used to rebut soviet moves in afghanistan
-policy of ROLLBACK
-3 main groups of people with regards to roll back
-advocates
-wooooo rollback
-pragmatists
-evaluate on a case-by-case basis, make sure we can win every single time
-opponents
-only use it in the face of overt soviet aggression
Contras
resistance movement fighting the Sandinista rule in Nicaragua
-subject of the Iran-Contra scandal
-US was illegally funneling them funds gained from arms dealings with Iran
Strategic Defense Initiative
Strategic Defense Initiative
-plans to protect america from the nuclear threat
-this was a problem for our allies
-if the US and Soviet Union both had their own SDI, any nuclear war would just destroy the rest of the world
-Soviets were like oh shit
-started the policy of SWARMING or MIRVing
-just shoot more missiles than the US can shoot down
-this, however is EXTREMELY expensive
-if SDI ever worked out, the balance of power was decisively shifted in the USs favor
-most effective point of the SDI was the psychological war being waged
-Soviets were so frightened that the US could get this then they'd just flip out
-soviets realized they couldn't build one
-americans actually couldn't build on either, but they succeeded in shanking the soviets
-lol hax. noobs.
Manuel Noriega
dictator of panama
-graduate of 'school of the americas'
-essentially a CIA training camp
-was on teh CIA payroll
-was a participant in the war with the contras
-was protected from US wrath by the reagan administration
Bush HAS to deal with this
-when he doesn't deal with him, it gives rise to the 'wimp factor'
the reason that the US had to dispose of noriega was not because he was a dictator
-this isn't really that much of a problem, as long as he's a US puppet
-the problem was that he was becoming irrational
-irrationality CANNOT be tolerated around the panama canal
Operation Just Cause
originally operation 'blue spoon', they didnt think that this'd be macho enough
-essentially the US rolled over noriega
-beat the living FUCK out of his regime, installed a legit government in its place
-UN 'deplored' the action, passed toothless resolutions against it
Powell Doctrine
Colin Powell- chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
-powell didn't want to send troops to yugoslavia, bosnia, or somalia
-however, wanted to send troops into europe LESS
-thought it was more dangerous
powell doctrine, you have to satisfy 3 criteria
-sufficient force, defined mission
-clear rules of engagement (you HAVE to express any limitations)
-clearly defined exit strategy
these applied in desert storm, powell thought they applied in somalia as well
other people didn't think so
-national security council had problems with the plan
-once the US forces are committed, nothing indigenous would develop to ensure their own security
-US mission would have to expand
-this is called MISSION CREEP
Kosovo Liberation Army
Sarajevo -> Srebrenica
key components of serb ethnic cleansing were the siege of sarajevo and taking of srebrenica
-srebrenica had its security GUARANTEED by international forces
-serbs just beat the shit out of the forces, slaughtered all the men
Kosovo
Croats finally regrouped, fucked up the serbs
-US uses a private firm to rebuild the croat military
-MPRI, a company made up of former US generals and officers
-croats launch OPERATION STORM, fuck up the serb army
once the serbs made the mistake of shelling a marketplace, the US could get into the war too
-US-led NATO forces begin a strategic bombing campaign that runs from August 30-September 20
-bombed the serbs to the negotiating table
-negotiated in Dayton, Ohio (Dayton Accords)
-signed in december
still problematic- KOSOVO
-over 90% ethnic albanians, even though its part of serbia
-the serbs keep repressing the albanians
-KLA forms- Kosovo Liberation Army
-this puts pressure on the western powers to resolve the issue
Defense Planning Guidance Declaration
NO IDEA WHATSOEVER
Project for a New American Century
Part of the "Vulcan" subset of neoconservatism
-vulcans
-took the name from the roman gold vulcan, god of the forge
-aaaaand he made a star trek reference. critiquing the name of the vulcan race. holy god.
-firmly entrenched in the Dept of Defense, VP's office, and in the private sector at the time of Bush's administration
-NSA Condi Rice, DefenseSec Rumsfeld, Dept DefSec Wolfowitz, VP Cheney
-questioned validity of deterrence and containment
-promoted aggressive actions on international scale
-attacked multilateral agreements
-most active proponents of expanding the war on terror to encompass states, terrorism is an issue of foreign policy/int'l relations
-evangelical interpretation of internationalism- power = a moralizing force
-only if it's consistent with american interests
-'project for a new american century' (PNAC)
-vehicle for advancing the NeoReaganite policies
-cochaired by Bill Kristol and Donald Keagan
2002 National Security Strategy
-National security statement, 2002
-US CANNOT USE DEFENSIVE POSTURE
-terrorists now use weapons of mass destruction, so any act they take will be devastating
-US must take anticipatory action to defend itself, EVEN IF UNCERTAINTY REMAINS in the time and place
-preemptive action's benefits beat out any possible costs that may be incurred
-containment and deterrence have gone out the window
-deterrence based solely on retaliation doesnt even work against rogue states, because they dont really care what happens to them
-no way in HELL it's gonna work against non-state actors
-now america is going out and looking for 'monsters to destroy'
-the view is that america asked for what happened on sept 11, because it wasn't proactive enough
-'liberal, humanitarianist imperialism' has worked in the balkans, it'll work in the middle east as well
-US needs to respond with asymmetric response to terrorist action
-massive retaliation is the way to go
-appeasement is what's been happening essentially with terrorists so far
-we had the chance to eliminate saddam in gulf war 1
-abandoning iraq in gulf war I was 'as shameful as abandoning south vietnam in 1975'
-taking out saddam hussein is justified as an expression of american national defense and self interest
-we need to impose 'effective imperial oversight' in the middle east
-'if we have to go it alone, we'll go it alone, but i'd rather not'
-in the end, war in iraq happened essentially alone, without UNSC resolution
-tenacious multilateralism still applies to the US and US actions, but not as much as it used to
-both US and Israel have signaled that they'd be willing to take unilateral, preemptive action against agressorsdkd
Washington Consensus
democratic socialization parts (3 specific goals of the washington consensus)
-Democracy
-Open Markets
-state downsizing
-Free Trade
this is called GEOECONOMICS
clinton embraces 'enlargement of the democratic community'
-the policy of democratic enlargement (labeled as the clinton doctrine)
-containment has served its purpose
-now we move to a new model
-counter the aggression, expand democracy aggressively
The consensus included ten broad sets of recommendations:
Imperial Overstrech
not quite sure what this is, but i can guess...
Part 2: Essay Questions
dkdkdkdkdkd
1. Provide a brief outline of the key factors responsible for the US decision to contain Soviet expansion after World War Two. Was the confrontation between the two superpowers inevitable or could it have been avoided?
The US has dealt w/ material threats before from Britain, Germany, & Japan and ideological threats such as Catholicism, but the US has never had to deal with both materials and ideological threats at once.
The USSR was the first time US had to deal with both material threat and ideological threat of Communism.
In the Yalta meeting in 1944 in Crimea, USSR; US was prepared to make compromises with the USSR but Stalin laid down non negotiable terms for the settlement of war. There was the issue of Poland that raised the question of honor and security.
Franklin D. Roosevelt repaired the League of Nations with United Nations and Stalin was willing to agree to the security council concept. The UN provided the USSR with a permanent seat and VETO power to have them join.
US had a stake in Europe because US had liberated Western Europe from Germany. US documented this time as massive retaliation.
George Kennan issued the Long Telegram in 1946-a blueprint of how US should deal with the USSR and a document of Containment.
USSR foreign policy stemmed from insecurity. USSR communist applied American idea of spreading their values, but where US actually believed in their values, the USSR didn't, they wanted to solely dictate, and it was a way to disguise their true objectives.
There was two approaches to US maintaining the BoP: universalitic with a community of nations through the UN solving differences through the root of law or the particularized approach, through interactions of state. In the Universalitic approach, USSR would cheat because their personality was different and they were hostile.
Kennan says US could not afford for the powers in between-UK, Germany, Japan-to go to the USSR.
The confrontation of these 2 powers were inevitable because there systems were irreconcilable and would only end at one expense of another. US had issue of security dilemma, and US and USSR was in international system driven by fear. US was status quo power while USSR was revisionists.
2. How did the proposed guidelines for US Cold War policy in NSC-68 differ from the concept of containment as originally defined by George Kennan? What explains this evolution in strategic thinking?
Kennan wanted US to maintain BoP through an Particularized approach through the interactions of state and the state system. It was more than defending US borders, US must look at those parts of the world that they can not do without and make their stand there but there raises the question of where should that line be drawn. Kennan saw this included Atlantic Community, eventually NATO, the Mediterranean and Middle East up to and including Iran, and in Asia, Japan, and the Philippines. Kennan saw five global power centers: US, UK, Germany, Japan and the USSR. He saw US at one end and the USSR at the other end. They could not afford for the powers in between to go to the USSR. Russian political power was threatening the US, not their military power. He worried about socialist subversion and indoctrination to more countries join the soviet system. He recommended a return to BoP through instilling self-confidence, exploiting tensions especially through USSR's relations with China and how their communism went in different directions, and the modification of the Soviet mindset as in to bring them closer to the Western perspective on the international system. Kennan drew up 3 criterias to those states deserving US aid to prevent them from being gobbled up: justified assistance, security, and costs vs. benefit ratio.
In Kennan's "X" Article 1947, his policy of firm containment was designed to confront USSR at every point, as a counter force. US was not restricted in any sense but full scale. He wanted to set up a perimeter around the Soviet Union periphery-an issue of defending threat. His position evolved after it was published. He said to apply strong point defense, to defend only the key regions around the borders because all the borders is out of US's ability. There was a need to distinguish two sense of interest: Vital and Peripheral. Vital interest goes back to Europe, Middle East, and Japan. It was strategic location, control of military/industrial capacity, raw materials, lines of communication. Peripheral was of mainland Asia.
At the wake of Communist success, there was second guessing to the policy of containment. When President Truman reviewed it, he realized US failed to adequately implement containment and there was a "relative decline" of US compared to USSR after building up military power and expansion. The Soviets were building its military force and making gains. The NSC-68, National Security Council 1950, was a doctrine responding to this that began with rejecting isolationism, to bring free world under dominion and anything non-communist. It endorsed containment seek by all means short of war to block further extension of soviet power. It aimed at exposing the falsity of USSR's intensions, and to foster a seed of destruction within the soviet system. It identified USSR trying to subvert the US's powers and US was going to do the same to them. A defeat anywhere is a defeat everywhere, any victory they make is a victory everywhere. They had to defend every state region against the Soviet. It was a switch from assymetric response of Kennan to one of flexible response to the treat. The doctrine is tested by outbreak of war. This response emphasized more on military action over diplomatic.
3. How was US intervention in the Korean conflict shaped by its wider commitment to the Cold War? what unique challenges did this present to US policy makers?
US was not prepared for peripheral war, and it came about with the the 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korea. Korea had been occupied by Japan during WWII. After Japan's defeat, Korea was simultaneously occupied by US and USSR and its sphere was drawn on the 38th parallel latitude with north as communist and south as non-communist. While General MacArthur and SoS Acheson were discussing full scale war with USSR, Truman and US was focused on break war in Europe as their main focus, because Korea was outside of US defense perimeter and a limited war. There was fear that since US failed to stand up to Hitler, Czecholvokia was taken over by German, that if US initially didn't take care of it, it will downfall. US got Truman support and UN approval for attack because the USSR was not there to veto, they had boycotted the security council. The resolution was passed to intervene in Korea. US found themselves in a limited war with no doctrine in defense of distant count
ry with no strategic interest, there was an issue of improvised conflict and policy makers were making it up as they went along. Truman wanted to bring Asian pacific region to wider circle of war and made key commitments but problem of how would Mao interpret these actions as defensive or tightening the loose around China and were these actions hostility towards China.
General MacArthur advocated for US to not just preserve South Korea but to bring North back, to "rollback" communism. MacArthur thought if Asia fell, Europe had no chance, and the real threat was in Asia.
There was the issue of mission creep, where US objective in Korea was a policy of repelling aggression and Truman had changed it to a policy of unification. Truman wanted to prevent third world war, didn't want a nuclear war, but MacArthur didn't accept this, he wanted to isolate war and wanted to win with whatever means necessary.
US learned from Korea war that never again will US attempt by force to free communist state and US can't furnish all components to solve the problem, the other party must act on its half as well.
4. The evolving nature of the U.S. intervention in the Korean conflict is an example of "mission creep" in U.S. foreign policy- cite other instances of "mission creep," describe the forces responsible, and explain why they have been so difficult to counteract.
The term “mission creep” refers to the deviation from original goals; usually refers to a military operation. An example of “mission creep” is the Korean War. The Korean War began because of the US goal of protecting South Korea from North Korean aggression. Though the US was initially successful, they deviated from the original goals in the Korean peninsula and sought to reunite the two Koreas; however, this proved to be unattainable and the war ended with a retreat through North Korea following an intervention by the Chinese. A more recent example of mission creep is US intervention in Somalia. Intervention in Somalia began in 1992 with a U.S. humanitarian mission, but later expanded into a UN mission called “Operation Hope,” dedicated to sending food to the starving Somali people. However, Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid stopped the foodstuffs from being delivered to the Somalis, causing widespread famine and what would later be determined as genocide. The U.S. humanitarian mission quickly dissolved into a military operation to oust Aidid instill order and democracy in Somalia. This was done through the support of the UN, whose Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali, felt personal antipathy towards Aidid. In mid-1993, the United States, under President Clinton, sent Army Rangers and Delta Force to Mogadishu where, in October, they launched an unsuccessful raid on Aidid’s headquarters to try to capture the vicious warlord. The operation, later known as the Battle of Mogadishu, was a complete failure, resulting in the loss of over 18 US soldiers and countless Somali civilians. The failure of the operation led to a withdrawal of both US and UN troops by 1995.
5. What lessons did US policy makers take from the intervention in the Korean conflict? How successfully have they been applied to subsequent interventions?
The lessons learned from the Korean War are that there are offensive and defensive limitations to US strength and capability, that wars beginning with the outbreak of the Cold War would be far more expensive than previously believed, and that the increase of the military, though dreaded and unwanted, was inevitable. The lesson from offensive limitations of the United States is that the US would never again try to free a communist state through overt force. In terms of defensive limitations, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delineated and expanded the US security perimeter in the Pacific Ring, declaring “American assistance can be effective when it is the missing component in a situation that might otherwise be solved…we cannot furnish will, desire, courage.” In terms of expenses, Final congressional authorization for expenditures was $48.2 billion, they originally thought that it would be $13.5 billion, an indication that the US military expenditures would unavoidably expand due to the changing international arena and rules of engagement in war. Lastly, new bases around the world increased the US military by 50%. By engaging in Vietnam, Truman permanently embedded the United States in an institutionalized cold war posture. Unfortunately, the lessons learned in North Korea have not been applied to subsequent US interventions, most notably in Vietnam. The lesson not learned and applied in Vietnam is the mistake of trying to free a communist state through overt force. The US went into Vietnam, a proxy war, to protect a non-communist south from an aggressive communist north. Like Eisenhower, President Kennedy saw Southeast Asia as a vital location to take a stand against communism. He saw all the communist countries in that area as cronies of the Kremlin, and saw to it that it was the United States’ responsibility to protect the liberty of South Vietnam; if the US failed to do this, our prestige would be damaged. However, unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy saw Vietnam as a political, not a military issue and considered Vietnam a limited war wherein nuclear deterrence would not be successful. Though Eisenhower began sending military advisers to South Vietnam in the 1950s, Kennedy increased the number of advisers and troops levels in Vietnam, a move that, under Johnson, would cause major escalations, immense fatalities, and result in one of the most damaging wars in US history.
6. What were the limitations of the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" approach to containment?
The “New Look” approach to containment involved two major factors: massive retaliation and liberation. The US would respond asymmetrically, meeting force with overwhelming force. The US would react to the communist challenge, and fight the war on its own terms. However, there were four major limitations/criticisms of this policy. One, there was excessive reliance on nuclear deterrence. There was a fear that the US would become a garrison state, and high spending might lead to deficits, inflation, and social costs. However, Eisenhower kept spending low and actually shrank the size of the military. Instead, through NSC 162/2, he decided that nuclear weapons would be used in convention warfare. It was said in 1955 that 171 nukes would have to be dropped in a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Eisenhower had “brinkmanship,” meaning he would be willing to go to the brink of war, having tough skin. In 1955, Eisenhower sought and got Congressional approval to get involved in Vietnam in an aggressive attempt to prevent the Domino Theory, and stop the communists. This strategy was seen as bad, since it seems foolish to destroying an entire nation with nukes to stop the communists.
A second short fall of the policy was the resulting Third World Revolutions. With decolonization, new, independent states formed. The Administration, with the CIA, practiced psychological operations to bring new leaders on board with the US. There were CIA-coordinated coups, assassination attempts, international spying, and domestic infiltration of social groups. The CIA saw success in a number of cases, including Iran in 1951 with Operation Ajax and Guatemala with Operation Success. The policy’s dependence on these practices was heavily criticized.
The third shortfall of “New Look” was the Missile Gap. In 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik and demonstrated their capabilities to launch long-range missiles that could strike the US. America was no long isolated or protected by the oceans and in November 1957, the Gaither Report recommended an acceleration of ICBM/SLBM progress. However, Eisenhower failed to implement all the recommendations. In the end, the Soviet buildup turned out to be a bluff.
The final shortfall of the policy was Failed Negotiations. The US failed to negotiate with the Soviets, and Eisenhower’s agenda kept changing. Also, the administration failed to split China from Russia.
7. In your opinion, have US covert operations to destabilize foreign governments worked to promote the interests of the US? Cite at least three examples.
FAILURES
Three instances of the United States staging covert operations to destabilize foreign governments are in Cuba in the 1960s (The Bay of Pigs in 1961), Chile in 1970, and the Iran-Contra Affair in the 1980s under President Reagan. All three operations were unsuccessful in their attempts to promote US interests abroad, evidence that covert operations may not be the greatest alternative to open diplomacy.
SUCCESSES
operation ajax- mossadegh in iran, operation success- Guatemala, operation condor and the lead up to in in Chile
8. What did the Soviets hope to achieve by a policy of stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba? In your view, was this policy viable?
In 1962, the Soviet Union began deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to missile sites in Cuba, almost undetected by the United States. In doing so, the Soviets hoped to repair the missile gap between the United States and the rest of the world, to defend Cuba from any United States threat or invasion (like the Bay of Pigs), and as a response to the United States placing Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Essentially, the Soviets tried to pose a threat to the United States in Cold War Zero-Sum fashion. This was intended to strengthen a communist country within reach of the United States, and to cause panic within America. The deployment of missiles to Cuba was known as Operation Anadyr, (led by Khruschev’s crony Issa Pliyev) and was secret, fast-paced, and involved over 50,000 personnel. The Soviets had intended to announce it publicly to the UN in November 1962; by mid-July the first boast had left the USSR. The weapons deployed to Cuba included ballistic missiles capable of hitting any target in the United States, as well as rigged bombers, MIGs fixed with cruise missiles, tactical missiles, and submarines. On October 13, 1962, U2 reconnaissance planes detect and confirm Soviet nuclear deployment in Cuba; President Kennedy learns of this on October 16. President Kennedy’s response was that he will “do whatever must be done to defend security,” as any type of offensive is not tolerated by the United States. For the next thirteen days, the world stood at the brink of nuclear war, and practiced Brinkmanship. Although there were supporters of an air strike among Kennedy’s advisers, Kennedy chose the alternative of a quarantine of Cuba, which ended up to be successful. The Soviets lost this battle of the Cold War, as well as a significant amount of legitimacy at the UN. The policy was not viable; the Soviet Union did not anticipate the reaction of the United States. The USSR’s lack of foresight and inability to accurately calculate the repercussions of entering an arms race with the United States led to its demise.
9. To what extent can the near-catastrophic outcome of the confrontation over the Soviet deployment of a nuclear deterrent in Cuba be ascribed to failure in communication between the key players in the crisis?
The issues here is mirror-imaging. Leaders were assuming that their counterparts were operating under the same assumptions as they were. They failed to anticipate the actions and reactions of others. One example of this that precipitated the event was Operation Quick Kick. This was a training exercise that practiced amphibious invasions. Khruschev perceived these as practice for invading Cuba. The issue was the Soviet intelligence that if the US made a full invasion of Cuba, the Cuban army could last about a week. So, Khruschev determined that they needed nuclear deterrence. After the US put Jupiter ICBMs in Turkey, Khruschev wanted to put the nukes in Cuba so they could trade and take nukes out of both places. Operation Anadyr somewhat subtly moved troops and tactical and strategic nukes to Cuba. An example of mirror-imaging here is that Khruschev thought this would force the US to balance by having him take nukes out of Cuba and the US take nukes out of Turkey; he did not consider the US’s long-standing geopolitical advantage of being far away. He saw the American reaction as panicking, but really this was the first time America was really threatened. Another example is that when the Americans were dropping practice depth-charges at Soviet submarines, they didn’t know the subs were equipped with nukes; had the commander panicked and launched a nuke, it could’ve started a war.
10. Intervention in the conflict in Southeast Asia has been described as a "necessary war" from a US perspective. Summarize the justifications for this point of view and discuss whether you agree or disagree.
Interventions in Southeast Asia weren’t necessary. When Kennedy was made president, he declared that any threats to liberty would be protected with force. Kennedy saw Vietnam as a political issue, not just a military issue, so he felt that in order for the US to keep their prestige they had to stop communist aggression; they couldn’t afford to appear to be weak. Once America was committed, they could not just back out because of the risk of losing reputation and prestige in the global village. Also, there was the issue of credibility. The rest of the world evaluated how valuable the United States was as an ally against communism. “These places were not contested because they were important. They were important because they were contested.” Once it started, Vietnam was important; the United States could not even appear to lose because that would be unacceptable. Intervention in Southeast Asia was deemed necessary because it started, it existed.
I disagree, because although hindsight is 20/20, it was easy to predict that the US army couldn’t successfully fight in Vietnam without the help of the SVA. Economically and politically it didn’t make sense because the US was supporting an authoritarian, military government that was not supported by its people. They were just supporting a nominal war against communism instead of promoting an actual war for democracy.
11. Given the strategic parameters of the Cold War, was it ever possible for the US to win the kind of war it hoped to fight in Southeast Asia?
No. See above.
12. Why was the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia so protracted? Why did the Nixon administration feel constrained to adopt the policy of "Vietnamization" and how successful was it?
Nixon wanted to get out of Vietnam, but he also wanted “Peace with Honor.” Initially, the US believed that they could win in Vietnam, and made continued attempts at defeating the North Vietnamese even though it was apparent that winning was next to impossible. The US strategy of “search and destroy” didn’t work against the guerilla warfare. Continued bombing raids and movements of the front line served to draw out the war. Nixon, through his policy towards détente, began to view the struggle against the communists through a much larger scope, and saw Vietnam as only a small part of the greater policy. However, he still wanted to leave with honor. Increasing pressure both abroad and at home finally led Nixon to pull out the troops. Nixon wanted to begin diplomatic peace talks with the Soviets and ally with China, so he decided to implement “Vietnamization” as a way to get out of Vietnam on peaceful and somewhat respectful grounds. Vietnamization was not successful in the sense that it didn’t help South Vietnam hold back the North Vietnamese. However, the nation as whole united in the end, which contributed to the overall détente and power balance Nixon sought.
13. What did Richard Nixon hope to achieve by opening diplomatic relations with China? Were his goals realized?
The Nixon Doctrine called for its allies to take care of their own defense so that the US could focus on protecting its own interests. Nixon believed the US should have an international relations policy focused on ensuring a balance of power in the global system. He believed that China was vital to America’s foreign policy. He also saw China as an opportunity to counter Soviet expansion. In 1969, there was a USSR-China border dispute in Siberia. Nixon warned that the US would not remain neutral, and would not tolerate a Soviet invasion of China. In 1972, Nixon went to China to open formal dialogue. In February, 1972, Nixon, Kissinger and Chinese officials meet in person to lay out the Shanghai Communiqué. China promised they would not interfere in Indo-China, agreed to not ally with USSR, and promised to stand with the US against any state’s attempt at Asian or World domination – a direct alliance against the USSR. Nixon’s goals were realized because the Soviets were forced to come to agreement with the US and become more of a “status-quo” state. In May, 1972, agreements were signed between Nixon and Moscow, including the ABMT. The basic principles of the agreement and of Nixon’s goals were to avoid confrontation, have mutual restraint, avoid unilateral advantages, and have the willingness to coexist peacefully in the long term.
14. How did the era of detente mark a break with the established US approach to international relations? Why did this break occur?
The era of détente marked a break with the established approach because it took the exemplarist position. Through the Nixon Doctrine, American expected its allies to take care of their own defenses because otherwise, the US would never be able to take care of themselves. He sought to move the world system to one of multi-polarity to take pressure off the United States. This era stood in stark contrast to the aggressive US foreign policy of decades before, which stipulated that the US would do anything and everything to stop its enemies in their tracks. Throughout the Cold War, the US was heavily involved in the politics and protection of other nations, including numerous economic and CIA operations. This break occurred because the US was desperate to get out of Vietnam, realizing it could not win. Nixon sought to relieve pressure on the United States’ economy and military. He believed that through negotiations and soft-politics, American would be able to maintain its dominate position in the world sphere, but do so while ensuring the protection of its interests.
15. In your view, were US-Soviet relations under detente conditions a viable long-term proposition? If not, what issues were responsible for undermining detente?
No, Détente began to unravel in 1979 due to a series of events. The Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis embarrassed the United States and led much of the American public to believe their nation had lost its international power and prestige.
Also : Brezhnev Doctrine: to intervene whenever "external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system." This was used to justify the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
Thus America seemed to be a in a weak geopolitical state towards the end of détente. Humiliation in Iran + soviet victory (at the time) of Afghanistan meant US could no longer stand by.
Also thousands of ICBMs still pointed at each other. The annihilation of one side by the other was only a button away.
Conflicts in the third world still raged during détente. America supported coups in Latin America towards the right.
16. What was distinctive about the foreign policy agenda Ronald Reagan brought to the presidency when he took office? How successful was he in fulfilling this agenda?
Reagan had "instincts included an unshakable belief in democracy and capitalism, and abhorrence of communism, an impatience with compromise in what he regarded as a contest between good and evil, and a deep fearfear that the Cold War might end in a nuclear holocaust" – Gaddis p. 350 Reagan had"optimism: faith in the ability of the US to compete succcessfuly within the international system" – Gaddis
"he was unusual in that he rejected the legacies of earlier administrations as well, including those of his fellow Republicans Nixon and Ford."
-Rejected Containment because it seemed to be failing…
Replaced with rollback/Reagan Doctrine. Engaged USSR overtly/covertly and rhetorically. Called USSR an "evil empire"
-MAD had to go
"Reagan's objective was…to prepare the way for a new kind of soviet leader by pushing the old Soviet system to the breaking point" – Gaddis
Wanted to outspend the soviets. – SDI and ABMs
Rejected SALT as legitimation of MAD.
17. What were the key objectives of the Reagan Doctrine? How effective was it in practice?
1. A Direct Confrontation by Arms buildup
2. Proxy war in 3rd world
3. Assertion of moral superiority in the war of ideas.
The War of Ideas - reagan didn't think communism was viable. He said something was going on behind the iron curtain that we were ignoring. Our foreign policy should be to show by example the greatness of our system. "Exemplarist" position. He argued that we will not contain communism but we will transcend communism. This will be accomplished by challenging and not acknowledging the soviet position. Whereas détente tried to legitimize USSR, reagan tried to change this. i. US should impose what the marshal group called cost-imposing strategy. In other words Détente was in favor of USSR. Instead US should increase pressure to expose these cracks. Wherever USSR had commitments, US should increase pressure. Marshal group was winning by means of attrition. Individual battles did no matter that much such as proxy wars. But the big picture was important. Victory by attrition. US was bigger and more powerful, she could afford to fight longer than the USSR. This won the favor of reagon.
ii. Every aspect of bureaucracy funding had to be justified in terms of how it would make the soviets to increase their own spending.
iii. In absence of clear cut victory there would come a time where soviets could simply not keep up. They would arrive at a tipping point twhere the whole system would unravel.
Highly effective: Afghanistan became USSR's Afghanistan. SDI further strained an economy that was spending 1/3 GDP on defense. And rhetoric made soviet leaders cower and challenged the legitimacy of USSR. Dissidents within the empire were roused and encouraged to challenge soviet rule.
However, Gorbachev played just as big if not bigger part in ending the cold war as Reagan. So credit has to go out to both rather than just Reagan doctrine.
18. How significant a role did the Strategic Defense Initiative play in ending the Cold War?
"The psychological success of SDI was truly remarkable, perhaps even a stroke of political genius. As Reagan said, "SDI wasn't conceived by scientist^.""
"There is no way of measuring how much SDI contributed to the Soviet Union's fall. But SDI did contribute, and the Cold War did end, peacefully, though, as Velikhov remarked, "at times we were getting
very close to open conflict.""
SDI pushed the right buttons. Soviets were weakest at microelectronics and computers, SDI exploited just that. In addition, USSR was already spending close to 1/3 of their GDP on defense. Their fear of the US developing a SDI and forever changing the balance of power made them spend even more on defense. SDI was part of many problems for the USSR that lead to its collapse.
More notable for the psychological effects than military potential.
19. Was the US able to implement a coherent foreign policy agenda after the fall of the Soviet Union? Outline the nature of US intervention in at least four international crises during the period 1989-2001 to support your argument?
20. How does the US benefit from its participation in multilateral relationships with other states? Do these benefits outweigh the risks to US autonomy outlined by the New Sovereigntists?
21. Describe the key differences between the US foreign policy programs of the "vulcans" and "guardians"- which group was able to seize the agenda after September 11, and why?
-neocons split into two groups
-vulcans
-took the name from the roman gold vulcan, god of the forge
-aaaaand he made a star trek reference. critiquing the name of the vulcan race. holy god.
-firmly entrenched in the Dept of Defense, VP's office, and in the private sector at the time of Bush's administration
-NSA Condi Rice, DefenseSec Rumsfeld, DepDefSec Wolfowitz, VP Cheney
-questioned validity of deterrence and containment
-promoted aggressive actions on international scale
-attacked multilateral agreements
-most active proponents of expanding the war on terror to encompass states, terrorism is an issue of foreign policy/int'l relations
-evangelical interpretation of internationalism- power = a moralizing force
-only if it's consistent with american interests
-'project for a new american century' (PNAC)
-vehicle for advancing the NeoReaganite policies
-cochaired by Bill Kristol and Donald Keagan
-guardians
-contrast to vulcans
-'reluctant warriors'
-occupied StateDept, and served with bill clinton as well
-SecState Powell, DepSecState Armitage, Director of StateDept Planning Staff Haas
-huge divergence of opinion between StateDept and DoD, also dichotomy between NSA and CIA
-guardians are highly resistant to engagements where use of force is the first option
-diplomatic, economic maneuvering to contain states
-even police actions are better options
-pays attention to balancing US power with other states
-NOT LOOKING FOR HEGEMONY
-even just preeminence among like-minded states
-two groups of neocons have been fighting for control since Bush I
-wolfowitz with cheney and libby wrote a memo detailing how to deal with the fall of the soviet union
-US should INCREASE defense spending
-assert itself as the sole superpower to quash the rise of regional powers that take advantage of the fall of the soviet union
-first use of the term 'coalitions of the willing'
-US cannot bring on board all multilateral structures, but bring whoever we can convince
-even if we can't, we'll bring on board whoever we can
-and we'll take action ourselves in 'defense of our interests
-first time preventive and preemptive war were brought into discussion
-bush I told them to sanitize the paper, remove all preemptive or unilateral action
-guardians win this round
-vulcans then start arguing that containment has failed
-new strategy is necessary to remove saddam hussein from power
-when bush II takes office, CHINA is the vulcan's plan of action
-advocates action NOW rather than later, while the balance of power was still on their side
-Sept. 11, 2001 happened
-turns out that all along, international terrorist organizations are now the biggest problem
-on SEPT 12, rumsfeld asked about attacking iraq as well as al-qaeda
-vulcans still looking to move up
-powell avoided striking iraq
-said that US should attack Al-Qaeda first
-right then, american people were looking to get back at Osama and Al-Qaeda
-over powell's objection, Bush called the attacks more than acts of terror, but ACTS OF WAR
-vulcans win here, it's the start of a WAR between states and non-states
-terrorism is the new threat to meet American power
-bush quote- we will pursue terrorists wherever they hide and hut anyone that helps them
-'you are with us or against us'
-THATS THE BUSH DOCTRINE RIGHT THERE ^^
-now vulcans support 'regime change' in iraq
-state of the union in 2002, bush puts iraq in the 'axis of evil'
-presented as a prime threat to the US
-June 2002- bush says that the marine corps must be ready to strike at a moment's notice anywhere in the world
-states that the US must be ready to take preemptive military action to ensure security
-same thing said in the state of the union- identifying threats and eliminating them BEFORE THEY HAPPEN
22. What lessons can be learned from the US record in its efforts at international nation-building historically and how do these lessons apply to Iraq today?
Two main examples are Somalia and the Philippines. Can sub in Vietnam instead. In Somalia and the Philippines, readings are Judis and Halberstam. General concepts can be found in Hook article and Kirkpatrick reading, as well as lecture. In Somalia: in this case, Sheppard is asking about nation-building in the context of democracy promotion. Somalia is a negative example, what you should not do. (part of nation-building is democracy promotion). Halberstam notes that Somalia was a non-state, meaning there is no central authority; it was ruled by warlords and clan leaders. Iraq is an artificial state formed by the British, not a real consolidated nation-state. Issue: consider the structure of the state before you intervene. Issue 2: Mission creep or policy drift. The UN wanted to politically transform Somalia; the US initial mission was as a humanitarian mission; establish enough security to distribute food. It became deposing Aidid, disarming clans, building a government. Apply this to Iraq. The initial justification for invading Iraq was WMD, but mission creep/policy drift led to nation-building/democracy promotion. The issue of public supporting both Somalia and Iraq is important. The Somalia public support was very shallow; driven by images of starving children on CNN, stopped by images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. In Iraq, public support has fallen. Is it shallow or durable? The public support was durable, as the majority was in favor of it for about two years (51% supporting American action in Iraq). Somalia: shallow, Iraq: durable, but not durable enough to take on a mission that might last 10 years. In Somalia, there were personal issues involved—a relationship between UN Secretary General Butros-Ghali and Aidid. Butros-Ghali hated Aidid and his perception of the situation in Somalia was driven by his personal feelings of Aidid. Counterintuitively, had it been someone else, the UN wouldn’t have pushed as hard. Admiral Howe was insulted by Aidid, and drove him to push for a Somali intervention. In Iraq, Bush has the ties of his father’s experiences in the Middle East. Some might argue that Bush has a complex of trying to outdo his father and has a vendetta against Hussein b/c he tried to kill Bush, Sr. In other words, don’t let personal issues dictate policy. Both Aidid and Hussein were demonized and became evil in the eyes of the Americans. Bureaucratic conflict (Somalia): Ambassador Albright supported nation-building agenda. SoD Aspen wanted to pull out US troops as quickly as possible. Clinton, Lake, and Christopher all were absent, so no one really minded the store. In Iraq, there were significant and prolonged disagreements between the State and Defense departments. Nationalism: in Somalia we had the phenomenon wehre the more intrusive the US and UN become, the more the Somalis became negative towards them (against nation-building efforts; they were almost neo-colonial). In Iraq, the Iraqis were initially happy we ousted Saddam, however the mood changed. In Iraq, there’s multiple nationalisms divided by religion and location. Sunni insurgents wanted to oppose US, Kurds wanted independence. Democracy promotion: Somalia was part of mission creep and towards the end a rhetoric of democracy was used to drum up support. In regards to Iraq, the rhetoric of democracy is also used to gain support. Hook: nation-building and democratization.
23. Has the US consistently supported the extension of democracy internationally? If not, what issues complicate this agenda?
No; the issue of democratization (domestic politics, ideas conflict with interests—economic and security interests, difficult/implausible—there are certain things that need to be in place in order to promote democracy, i.e. cultural cohesion, equal distribution of wealth, pluralistic civil culture, labor unions that mediate between society and state, American political tradition—isolationism would undermine goal, as well as exemplarism, empirical/real world—it’s difficult to have your interests and ideas of democracy be consistent with each other). Hendrickson and Tucker article.
24. Why has US unipolar hegemony persisted since the end of the Cold War?
a. Wohlforth (3)
1. US unipolarity is real and absolute (unambiguous)
-US is military, economic, and technological leader
-Costs of balancing against the US are too great (other nations will bandwagon with US)
2. US unipolarity is large and prone to peace
-Secondary states will bandwagon with US
-US doesn’t exert power as a hegemon most of time, instead choosing to engage in multilateralism
3. Durability
-Potential rivals are more challenged by each other than the US
- E.U. and China have their own reasons for failing to challenge US (in question 25)
b. Wilkinson (2)
1. US can avoid imperial overstretch because of technology
2. US unipolarity w/o hegemony brings stability to the system
c. Lane (3) (Why no one balances US)
1. Duality of US power (Use of multilateralism AND military action)
2. Lack of balancers (who have their own internal problems)
3. Balancing an existing hegemon is far more difficult than challenging a rising hegemon (US found itself in a unique position with sudden collapse of Soviet Union)
*Soft balancing is another reason: includes economic prebalancing and leash-slipping as types of balancing available to other nations (these are slower than hard balancing using military strength).
25. What challenges will US unipolar hegemony face in the future? Make plausible arguments depicting the rise of at least two potential rivals to the US in your answer.
European Union
Arguments For:
-Integration of the great European powers has harnessed the size and economic might of Europe into a single power. (Unification of Germany is key)
-Adopted a common identity, flag, currency etc. Leads to a sense of European nationalism (same characteristics as United States).
Arguments Against:
-Population of Europe is aging
-Integration of Eastern Europe is proving difficult (adding poorer nations to the EU will weaken its strength, draining it financially)
-No centralized/strong military
-Immigration from Turkey and Middle East
China
Arguments For:
-China’s imperialistic past has shown its potential
-Communist Authoritarian Government
-Demographics (surplus of males)
-Largest Military (personnel)
-Growing Demand for Resources (raw materials from neighboring nations)
-Rising Sense of Nationalism
Arguments Against:
-China has never displayed a global ambition to spread its idealism
-Secular State (shares US interests against such issues as Islamic Terrorism)
-Liberalized Economy
-Tendency to settle conflicts peacefully (through multilateralism)
-Regional Hatred (neighboring nations dislike China (Japan))
